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The impetus for the present inquiry is a long-
standing, well-documented inconsistency in motivation 
research. This inconsistency, which will be termed, 
motive noncorrespondence, stems from the failure of 
different measures of the same motive construct to 
intercorrelate significantly. Specifically, self-report 
measures of intimate, affiliative, efficacious, or 
dominant social motives are generally unrelated to 
contentually equivalent projective measures (McClelland, 
1980). Researchers such as Entwisle (1972) and Raven 
(1988) have argued that psychometric problems associated 
with either projective or self-report motive measures 
account for motive noncorrespondence. For them, both 
measure types tap the same construct, though one more or 
less well than the other. Others, however, find 
psychometric explanations hard to swallow, as both self-
report and projective motive measures predict motive-
relevant behaviors under certain conditions (McClelland, 
1980) . 
The present investigation examines the utility of the 
bi-level explanation, a recently advanced alternate 
explanation for motive noncorrespondence. McClelland, 
Koestner, and Weinberger (1989) contend that self-rep9rt 
and projective motive measures do not interrelate 
substantially because they tap distinct motivational 
layers of the individual. Projective motive measures tap 
the implicit motivational system--an unconscious, affect-
based arrangement that is aimed at the ongoing 
2 
satisfaction of basic, often contradictory, wishes. Self-
report measures, on the other hand, assess a self-attributed 
motivational system. This conscious, verbal-conceptual 
network is concerned with the production of 
behavior consistent with both self-image and social 
demands. Through McClelland et al.'s (1989) propositions, 
the psychodynamic ego and id have crept back into 
motivational psychology, albeit sporting a more 
contemporary, scientifically-acceptable metaphorical 
clothing. Freud (1910) and Jung (1971) derived much of 
their explanatory firepower from the postulation of 
dialectically opposed, or at least poorly aligned, 
intrapsychic subsystems (Rychlak, 1981). Likewise, 
McClelland et al. propose that the id-like implicit system 
and ego-like self-attributed system are somewhat at odds 
in the normative case. Projective and self-report motive 
measures are unrelated because they tap layers of 
personality that are typically incongruent. 
The ensuing research seeks validation of the bi-level 
explanation_in two different ways. The first involves 
demonstrating that projective and self-report motive 
measures do in fact correspond, but only for certain 
people. Specifically, inner-directedness and other-
directedness (Wymer & Penner, 1985), two self-
3 
consciousness variables, will be employed to identify a priori 
groups for whom implicit and self-attributed systems should 
and should not correspond. To the degree that these groups 
differ in predicted ways, the bi-level explanation will be 
upheld. Additionally, personal strivings (Emmons, 1989) and 
personality abilities (Paulhus & Martin, 1987), two motive-
like constructs, will be examined. If the constructs' 
conceptual relations to implicit and self-attributed motives 
are reflected empirically, the bi-level explanation will again 
be supported. It is noteworthy from the outset that patterns 
of intermotive relationship will be examined in a way that 
departs somewhat from research tradition. Traditional 
motivational investigations typically address circumscribed 
motivational contents, such as achievement, power, intimacy, 
and affiliation. Presently, focal motives will be construed 
as reflecting either agency or communion (Bakan, 1966) , two 
broad, superordinate categories. Agency connotes aims of 
separation, mastery, and dominance, while communion reflects 
aims of unity, intimacy, and nurturance. The imposition of 
organizational rubric affords a conceptual coherence, 
clarity, and generalizability that is often lacking in_ 
psychological studies of more idiosyncratic, limited 
dimensions (Rychlak, 1981) . 
In summary, the present investigation works at the 
interface of contemporary motivational and psychodynamic 
domains. It is hoped that McClelland et al. 's (1989) bi-
level explanation, a reframing of basic psychodynamic 
concepts, will help elucidate motive noncorrespondence, a 
long-standing anomaly in motivational research. 
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CHAPTER II 
IMPLICIT AND SELF-ATTRIBUTED MOTIVES 
In this chapter a more detailed account of implicit 
and self-attributed motives will be advanced. Early 
sections will sequentially address motives in general, 
implicit and self-attributed motives in particular, and 
relationships between implicit and self-attributed 
motives. Subsequent sections will examine a number of 
constructs that may mediate and/or shed further light upon 
relationships between the two motive types. 
The Motive Construct 
Before the differences between implicit motives and 
self-attributed motives can be more closely examined, the 
similarities between them should be underscored and 
clarified. These similarities reside in their shared 
grounding in the more general idea of motive. Motives are 
abstractly defined by McClelland and his associates as 
emotionally-charged groupings of ideas or images that 
express basic wishes or desired experiences (Winter & 
Stewart, 1978). McAdams (1988b), for example, defines 
motives as "affectively-toned cognitive clusters centered 
around general preferences" (p. 71). The imagistic 
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component of the motive, then, is a representation of a 
desired outcome in one's ongoing life; the affective 
component represents a sense of vitality, press, or 
urgency that accompanies the imagistic component. 
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While motives themselves are unobservable, they do 
exert observable effects on behavior and experience. 
Specifically, "motives energize, direct, and select 
behavior" (McAdams, 1988b, p. 71). Individuals high in 
achievement motivation, for example, will persist longer 
than others when put in an achievement-related situation, 
such as taking a final examination (Atkinson & Litwin, 
1960). In other words, they become more driven or active, 
sustaining achievement-related behaviors for longer 
periods of time than others. Achievement-oriented people 
also can identify achievement-related words, presented 
tachistoscopically, more quickly than others (McClelland & 
Lieberman, 1949) : in this example, achievement-oriented 
individuals selectively focus, or direct, their attention 
toward achievement-related stimuli. Finally, achievement-
oriented individuals have been found to learn moderately 
difficult materials more quickly than others (McClelland, 
Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953); they more effectively 
select out responses that lead to the achievement reward 
(i.e., learning the materials). More generally, a 
motive's activity is inferred from the thematic ordering 
it exerts upon the individual's overt and covert behavior. 
Motives organize interpersonal behavior, fantasy, 
cognition, selective attention, perception, and memory. 
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The motive construct can be further clarified by 
identifying its philosophical grounding in Aristotelian 
notions of final, formal, and efficient causation. Causes 
in general are grand meta-constructs, or predicate 
assumptions, that we bring to bear in explaining or making 
sense of various phenomena (Rychlak, 1981). A final cause 
is "any concept used to account for the nature of things 
(including behavior) based on the assumption that there is 
a reason, end, or goal 'for the sake of which' things 
exist or events are carried out" (Rychlak, 1981, p. 500). 
Popular final cause constructs in psychology are needs, 
wishes, and goals. A formal cause meta-construct, on the 
other hand, is ''any concept used to account for the nature 
of things (including human behavior) based on their 
patterned organization, shape, design, or order" (Rychlak, 
1981, p. 500). Formal cause meta-constructs underlie 
popular psychological concepts such as trait, personality 
style, and personality type. Efficient causes, finally, 
are concepts "used to account for the nature of 
things ... based on the impetus in a succession of events 
over time" (Rychlak, 1981, p. 499). Such concepts are 
expressed in behaviorism's S-R laws and in cognitive 
psychology's computer flowchart models. Final, formal, 
and efficient causes, then, are three different meta-
constructs or perspectives that we employ in grasping or 
making sense of phenomena under study (e.g., motivation, 
personality). Furthermore, the three constructs are 
complementary rather than mutually exclusive, each making 
a valuable and distinct contribution to our construing. 
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In seeking to avoid the pitfalls of confounding 
different framings of the same phenomenon with different 
phenomena, the present paper views motives as hybrid 
efficient-formal-final cause constructs that encompass 
connotations of impetus, trait, and need/wish. As is 
suggested by the motive construct's historical basis in 
the mechanistic drive models of Freud (1940) and Hull 
(1943), motives can be seen as primary impetuses that 
temporally precede behavior and actually propel the 
individual into action--this sense is reflected in 
McClelland's (1980) aforementioned definition of motives 
as "drivers," "directors," and "selectors." Motives also 
encompass both the final-cause connotation of "need" and 
the formal-cause connotation of "trait." Many clinically-
oriented accounts of motives emphasize a final cause 
connotation, likening motives to wishes or fantasies for 
the sake of which individuals behave. Motives in this 
sense are imagined outcomes in the future for the sake of 
which the individual acts in the present. Motives, 
however, are also trait-like in that they account for the 
patternings in the individual's behavior. More 
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specifically, the individual brings behavioral patterns 
(traits) to bear in seeking attainment of a given end . 
(need) associated with a motive. The individual high in 
intimacy motivation, for example, has a desire, wish, or 
need for close contact with others. In seeking to attain 
close contact, the individual invokes a warm, intimacy-
fostering interpersonal stance, characterized by making 
eye contact, smiling, and laughing (McAdams, Jackson, & 
Kirshnit, 1984); the individual, in other words, evidences 
intimacy-related behavioral patterns. 
Implicit Motives and Self-Attributed Motives in Theory 
Implicit and self-attributed motives are both motives 
in the senses discussed above; both are clusterings of 
feeling-toned ideas or images that account for drive, 
need, and trait. However, the two motive types do differ 
from each other in a number of important ways. 
Specifically, they differ in terms of (1) their mode of 
operation; (2) the classes of behavior that they 
influence; (3) the types of incentives that encourage 
their expression; and (4) their proposed developmental 
origins. In this section, these differences will be 
discussed more fully. Henceforth, McClelland et al. 's 
(1989) labels for representing implicit and self-
attributed motives will be adopted: implicit motives will 
be signified by an .n, for "need" (e.g., n Power, .n 
Achievement, n Intimacy, etc.), and self-attributed 
motives will be signified by the prefix, san, for "sel_f-
attributed need" (e.g., san Power, san Achievement, san 
Intimacy) . 
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One hallmark of implicit motives' operational mode 
involves a dissociation from conscious processing. 
Implicit motives belong to a primitive motivational system 
that "automatically influences behavior without conscious 
effort" (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 698). This is not to 
say that implicit motives are unconscious in the 
psychodynamic sense: implicit motives are not necessarily 
banished from awareness through the individual's active 
deployment of repression and its allied defenses (Biernat, 
1989). Instead, implicit motives "comprise a motivational 
system for which phenomenal (i.e., self-reflective) 
awareness is not a requirement of personality functioning" 
(Koestner & McClelland, 1990, p. 542). The implicit 
system, then, serves as a sort of "automatic pilot" for 
spontaneous behaviors, lending them their form and 
direction in the absence of conscious reflections and 
deliberations. A practical consequence of implicit 
motives' unconscious operational mode is that they 
orchestrate motivational and emotional life themes (i.e., 
formal-final cause orderings) that are "unevaluated as to 
their appropriateness in terms of (verbal) concepts of 
self, others, and what is important (McClelland et al., 
11 
1989, p. 698). There is, hence, no reason to assume that 
implicit motive dispositions should be in accord with the 
individual's conscious, verbalized self-image, at least in 
the normative case. Indeed, it is doubtful that accurate 
information pertaining to implicit motive dispositions can 
be obtained via self-reports (McClelland, 1980) . 
A second defining feature of implicit motives' 
operational mode concerns the issue of how information is 
represented. In this case, the "information" includes 
perceived and/or anticipated environmental events and 
perceived and/or anticipated personal responses. Implicit 
motives, unlike the more familiar verbal-conceptual 
schemas of information-processing theories, represent and 
process information via an affective code. Relevant here 
is Raynor and McFarlin's (1986) distinction between 
affective value and information value. Specifically, 
affective value addresses questions like, "How good or bad 
does this behavior feel?" or "How good or bad do I feel 
while behaving this way?." Information value, on the 
other hand, is concerned with the implications of a 
behavior for the self-image, addressing questions like, 
"How good or bad am I doing?" Representation of events 
based on their affective value, then, is experience-near 
and almost visceral, while representation based on 
information value is experience-distant and evaluative. 
Implicit motives are posited to represent situations in 
12 
terms of their immediate affective value only, remaining 
oblivious to situations' concomitant information value. 
In this sense, implicit motives bear resemblance to 
classical psychodynamic formulations of the id (Freud, 
1933), which seeks pleasure in the here-and-now and is 
unconcerned with the personal and social implications of 
behavior. 
Implicit motives' affective representational code, as 
well as their residence in psychic strata outside the 
bounds of conscious reflection, colors their domain of 
behavioral influence, associated behavioral incentives, 
and proposed developmental origins. As already alluded, 
implicit motives do not affect all behavior, but only a 
certain class of behavior. Specifically, implicit motives 
influence operant, or spontaneous, behavior (McClelland et 
al., 1989). Operant behaviors are responses that occur in 
the absence of any detectable external stimuli and hence 
appear to be spontaneous in the sense of ''unelicited" or 
''autonomously initiated" (McClelland, 1980); the operantly 
behaving individual appears to be operating-on the 
environment rather than responding-to it. By virtue of 
their autonomous qualities, implicitly motivated behaviors 
are more evident in behavior trends extended over time 
than in immediate, circumscribed behavioral episodes. 
This truism was even noted by Skinner (1938), who 
recommended that operant behaviors be measured in terms of 
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frequency of response over time rather than in terms of 
intensity of response to a known stimulus (McClelland et 
al., 1989). Implicit motives yield a thematic coherence 
to the full net of behaviors that an individual initiates 
over time. As such, they can be likened to internal 
navigation systems that guide the individual's behavioral 
course when external signposts, in the form of 
environmental initiatives, social expectations, and social 
constraints are absent. 
While it is true that implicitly motivated behaviors 
occur in the absence of external elicitors, this is not to 
say that they occur in the absence of any form of 
incentive. To the contrary, Koestner and McClelland 
(1990) assert that implicit motives are responsive to 
task-related, or behavioral, incentives, where behavior 
and reward are intimately intertwined. More specifically, 
the pleasure in implicitly-motivated behavior is a natural 
by-product of the behaving itself, coming from the "doing" 
rather than from the "having done." In this sense, 
implicit motivation bears similarity to intrinsic 
motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1980), which occurs when an 
individual becomes "absorbed in an activity because of its 
inherent qualities, such as its interest value or level of 
challenge" (Koestner & McClelland, 1990, p. 532). 
However, while the incentive for all intrinsically 
motivated activities is purported to be a sense of 
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competence and self-determination that accompanies action 
(Deci & Ryan, 1985), the behavioral incentives associated 
with various implicitly motivated activities are much more 
varied (e.g., feeling competent, feeling powerful, feeling 
close, etc.). 
The incentives for implicit behavior can also be 
understood as pleasurable, "innately triggered affective 
experiences" (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 697) that 
accompany motive-relevant experiences and behaviors. 
Actually, two studies have supported the framing of 
implicit incentives as ''hard-wired," internally-
administered emotional rewards. Individuals high in n 
Power evidence a greater release of norepinephrine than 
others when exposed to an impactful experience 
(McClelland, Ross, & Patel, 1985), and only people high in 
n Affiliation show increased dopamine release when viewing 
romantic films (McClelland, 1989); both norepinephrine 
(Olds, 1977) and dopamine (Wise, 1980} have previously 
been linked to pleasure and reinforcement. 
A final defining feature of implicit motives concerns 
their proposed developmental origins. Implicit motives 
are built upon a foundation of early, prelinguistic 
affective experiences (McClelland et al., 1989). Motive 
formation is thought to follow from the interaction of 
nature with nurture, whereby the individual's innate 
incentive proclivities (i.e., some people are 
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psychologically, or even biologically, wired to find 
dominating, doing better, or being close more pleasurable 
than others) are either activated or left dormant in early 
dealings with significant others. To the degree that the 
infant is exposed to motive-relevant interpersonal 
experiences, a consistent motive disposition will 
crystallize around the repeated experiencing of the innate 
behavioral incentive. Implicit motive predispositions are 
converted into formal motive dispositions, then, via 
repeated affective arousal (McClelland et al., 1989). 
It is presumed that motive predispositions that are not 
aroused via interpersonal experience (e.g., the infant 
with a strong proclivity to find closeness pleasurable 
who is raised in an icy, aloof family atmosphere) 
remain as latent motivational potentials in the adult. 
Rather than being ephemeral precursors to a verbal-
conceptual motivational system, implicit motives comprise 
a distinct, stable motivational setup that operates 
throughout the individual's lifespan. As an interesting 
sidenote, it is speculated that implicit motives, as 
outlined above, could conceivably develop in animals as 
well as in humans. McClelland et al. (1989), for example, 
note that since they are 
built on direct experiences of affect also 
characteristic of animals ... it should be possible for 
implicit motives like n Achievement and n Power to 
develop in animals without language, so long as the 
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species responds to the natural incentives on which 
these motives are based. (p. 698) 
Implicit motives, in fact, have been linked to the 
workings of basic midbrain structures that both humans and 
animals possess (McClelland, 1987a). 
Self-attributed motives comprise a second, 
developmentally more advanced motivational system that 
is divorced from the implicit system's grounding in basic 
affective reactions and (perhaps) animal heritage. 
Self-attributed motives rely upon a verbal-conceptual 
representational code. In other words, actions and 
experiences are perceived abstractly and linguistically 
rather than experientially and viscerally. Self-
attributed motives are, in fact, intimately related to the 
self-image, or the set of individual beliefs as to who one 
is, who one would like to be, and how one is supposed to 
behave. When the individual apprehends experience through 
the spectacles of self-attributed motives, experience is 
understood in terms of its relevance to this image 
rather than felt in terms of its immediate affective 
weight (Raynor & McFarlin, 1986). Self-Attributed 
motives' operational mode also involves self-awareness. 
Indeed, self-attributed motives are related to a 
representation of reality that is detached, self-
conscious, and decidedly evaluative--to an orientation 
toward self-as-object rather than toward behaving-as-
subject. An interesting result of this defining 
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involvement of consciousness is that self-attributed 
motives can only exert their influences under situations 
where the individual has become self-aware, or ego-
involved (deCharms, 1968). As long as the person is in a 
state of task involvement, or "absorbed in an activity 
because of its inherent qualities" (Koestner & McClelland, 
1990, p. 532), self-attributed motives are in a sense 
inert. If, however, one should become aware of the 
implications of an activity for one's intrapsychic (i.e., 
self-esteem) or interpersonal (i.e., social reputation) 
standing, then self-attributed motives will become active. 
In summary, then, self-attributed motives comprise a 
verbal-conceptual "'self-system,' which requires 
phenomenal awareness and is motivated to maximize 
positive value regarding one's self-image" (Koestner & 
McClelland, 1990, p. 542). 
Self-attributed motives are clearly more abstract and 
experience-distant than implicit motives, allying 
themselves with verbally-represented answers to the 
questions, "Who am I," "Who is it good to be?," and "Who 
would I like to be?" This is not to say, however, that 
self-attributed motives are detached cognitive entities 
with no behavior-determining firepower; like any motive, 
self-attributed motives do energize, direct, and select a 
certain class of behavior. Specifically, self-attributed 
motives govern respondent behavior, or behavior that 
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occurs in the presence of clear external elicitors. Where 
the operantly behaving individual appears to generate 
behavior from within, the respondently behaving individual 
seems to react. By virtue of their dependence of external 
elicitation, san-derived behaviors are manifest as 
fleeting behavioral episodes rather than as sustained 
behavioral trends. Self-attributed motives, for example, 
are especially predictive of choice behavior, or behavior 
involving "immediate specific responses to specific 
situations" (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 691). A second 
reason for self-attributed motives' lack of relationship 
to more sustained behavioral trends concerns the 
invocation of self-consciousness that is a prerequisite to 
their activity. Since self-consciousness itself is more 
of a fleeting, often socially-induced state than a stable 
phenomenal trait, it follows that the behavioral 
expression of self-attributed motive dispositions would 
have a similarly episodic nature. 
Where the incentives associated with implicit motives 
are task-intrinsic, the incentives pertaining to self-
attributed motives are decidedly social. Self-Attributed 
motives' incentives, paradoxically, have nothing to do 
with specific motive content: individuals high in san 
Power do not necessarily enjoy feeling powerful more than 
others, and people high in san Intimacy do not 
particularly enjoy closeness. Instead, the incentive for 
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san motive-derived behavior is the same regardless of the 
particular motive. Specifically, people high in a given 
self-attributed motive behave for the sake of identity 
confirmation and/or impression management. The former 
incentive involves a sense of intrapsychic congruence, in 
which the individual perceives personal behavior as being 
consistent with personal expectations. The latter 
incentive involves a sense of social competence, whereby a 
desired self-image has been effectively communicated to 
others, and the individual has responded correctly to 
perceived social demands and expectations. Along these 
lines, Koestner and McClelland (1990) note: 
rather than cherishing the process of performing an 
activity, extrinsically oriented people (i.e., san-
motivated people) behave as they believe they are 
supposed to. Instead of being associated with 
interest, (self-attributed motivation) is likely to 
be associated with feelings of pressure and tension. 
(p. 543) 
Actually, it is quite conceivable that the emotional 
component to san behavior's reward is the decrement in 
tension that follows successful self-presentation or 
identity confirmation. 
Since self-attributed motives are inextricably meshed 
with more developmentally advanced verbal-conceptual 
phenomena, it makes sense that they should develop 
somewhat later than do implicit motives. Self-attributed 
motives develop only after the individual "can comprehend 
linguistic communication and organize its meanings into 
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such constructs as self, others, and social norms'' 
(McClelland et al., 1989, p. 699). Rather than through 
affective arousal, as in the case of implicit motives, 
self-attributed motives are acquired through a process of 
cognitive assimilation, whereby the individual 
internalizes the explicit, often verbal, teachings of 
significant others and of society. In particular, self-
attributed motives are grounded in early teachings as to 
what values and goals one should pursue, or what 
motivational traits are good for the self. Along with the 
content of such teachings, the individual presumably 
internalizes the significant other's positive reactions to 
motive-consistent behaviors, such that subsequent motive-
driven behaviors are imbued with a positive evaluative 
overtone. 
Research on Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives 
This section is concerned with the empirical basis 
for the just-outlined distinctions between implicit and 
self-attributed motives. Although no studies to date have 
explicitly addressed the distinction between motives based 
on operational mode, numerous studies have examined the 
distinctions concerning class of behavior influenced, 
motive-related incentives, and developmental origins. 
While Chapter Four will address motive research as it 
bears upon the construct validity of specific, 
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circumscribed motives and motive measures, the present 
discussion is concerned with research on specific motives 
only as it pertains to a more general theory of implicit 
and self-attributed motivation. In this spirit, special 
attention will be given to those studies that include both 
implicit and self-attributed motive variables and thus 
permit a direct comparison of the two motive types' 
effects. 
Domain of behavioral influence. Over the years, a 
substantial body of data has been amassed supporting the 
idea that implicit motives predict trends in operant 
behavior over time (McClelland, 1980). An individual's 
level of intimacy motivation at age 30, for example, 
has been shown to predict marital happiness and 
psychosocial adjustment at age 47 (McAdams & Vaillant, 
1982). Similarly, n Achievement, assessed during college, 
has predicted employment in small business years after 
graduation (McClelland, 1965) as well as number of 
promotions in a large company over a three-year span 
(Andrews, 1967) and in another over a 16 year period 
(McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982). The implicit "leadership 
motive pattern," a combination of average or above-average 
n Power that also exceeds level of n Affiliation and is 
accompanied by high self control, has been shown to 
significantly predict off ice holding in voluntary 
organizations 14 years after motive assessment (Winter, 
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McClelland, & Stewart, 1981). 
While self-attributed motives have at times appeared 
to predict operant behavior as well, examination of 
specific studies reveals a proneness to alternate 
interpretations and/or an inability to establish the 
temporal precedence of the self-attributed motive 
disposition (Calder & Ross, 1973; McClelland et al., 1989; 
Mischel, 1968; Schuman & Johnson, 1976). For example, 
well-respected self-attributed motive scales, such as 
those included in Jackson's (1984) Personality Research 
Form (PRF), often employ peer rating-motive scale 
correlations as their sole demonstration of scale scores' 
relation to long-term trends in behavior (e.g., Jackson, 
1984; Paunonen, 1979). It is assumed in such studies that 
peer ratings reflect peers' simple observance of long-term 
trends in an individual's behavior. This assumption, 
however, is of questionable accuracy. It is quite 
possible that people who see themselves as possessing a 
certain motive orientation communicate these opinions 
about themselves to peers via conversations, etc; these 
peers may then only be dutifully reiterating subjects' 
relatively explicit self-descriptions in filling-out peer 
rating forms (McClelland, 1972, 1980). As a second 
example, Kreitler and Kreitler (1976) purported to have 
demonstrated the ability of san Achievement-like 
constructs to predict final grades. Examination of the 
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study, however reveals that achievement orientation 
correlated with grades received during the prior academic 
year, and hence, it is just as likely that grades 
predicted subsequent self-reported achievement 
orientation. In summary, then, there is little evidence 
that self-attributed motives predict extended trends in 
spontaneous behavior. 
There is, on the other hand, a good deal of evidence 
that constructs similar to self-attributed motives predict 
immediate responses to externally-defined situations 
(McClelland, 1980). For example, subjects' self-reported 
behavioral intents (i.e., a more circumscribed version of 
their self-attributed motives) for an immediately upcoming 
Prisoner's Dilemma game correlate highly with subsequent 
behavioral choices made in the game (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1970). On a more general level, Bandura (1982), in 
reviewing a number of confirmatory studies, concluded that 
judgments of self-efficacy in a specific domain of 
functioning strongly predict subsequent performance in the 
domain. Kreitler and Kreitler (1976), furthermore, found 
that childrens' self-attributed level of curiosity is 
significantly correlated with curious behaviors in an 
explicitly-defined testing situation; "explicitly-
defined," in this case means that potential curious 
behaviors were defined for children as such prior to 
testing. In summarizing findings such as these, Azjen 
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and Fishbein (1970) caution that ''the longer the time 
interval between the statement of intention (i.e., the. 
assessment of the san-like construct) and the actual 
behavior, the lower the correlation between intent and 
behavior will tend to be" (p. 469). San-like constructs 
are most predictive of behavior when construct and 
criterion evidence a high degree of co~respondence (Azjen 
& Fishbein, 1977), such that (1) self-reported construct 
and behavior are similar in level of specificity, and (2) 
the time lag between motive assessment and behavioral 
criterion is minimal. 
Unlike self-attributed motives, implicit motives do 
not generally predict behavior in situations characterized 
by a high degree of externally-provided structure or 
definition (Koestner & McClelland, 1990). As a case in 
point, the introduction of controlling external 
contingencies has repeatedly been found to dampen n 
Achievement's behavior-predicting power .. Andrews (1967) 
found that while n Achievement predicted work performance 
in a less-constraining work environment, these motive 
effects did not hold in a second work environment 
characterized by a more authoritarian, controlling 
organizational structure. Similarly, the imposition of an 
explicit competitive goal structure has been shown to 
eliminate performance differences between individuals high 
and low in n Achievement (Gresko & Morgenstern, 1974). It 
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is proposed that external structurings precipitate a shift 
from operant to respondent behavioral modes, with a 
corresponding shift in activation from implicit to self-
attributed motivational systems (Koestner & McClelland, 
1990) . 
While there is a plethora of studies that either link 
implicit motives to operant behaviors or self-attributed 
motives to respondent behaviors, there are precious few 
that include both (1) implicit and self-attributed motive 
measures and (2) operant and respondent behavioral 
criteria. In the first of these more definitive studies, 
Constantian (as reported in McClelland, 1985) gave college 
students both implicit (i.e., TAT) and self-attributed 
(i.e., self-report) measures of the affiliative motive, 
which is defined as a recurrent preference for 
establishing, maintaining, and restoring warm 
interpersonal relationships (Atkinson, Heyns, & Veroff, 
1954; Boyatzis, 1973). Subsequent to motive measurement, 
subjects' affiliative behavior in both operant and 
respondent domains was assessed. The operant measure 
involved an experience sampling approach, where subjects 
wearing pagers were beeped randomly and repeatedly over a 
number of days. Upon each paging, subjects were 
instructed to describe what they had been doing 
immediately prior to paging, among other things. Operant 
affiliative behavior, in this case, was operationalized as 
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the number of random pagings for which a subject was found 
talking with someone. In contrast to the operant 
behavioral criterion, which left subjects' behavior 
unconstrained and assessed behavioral trends extended in 
time, the respondent criterion tapped immediate 
affiliative choice behavior. Specifically, subjects were 
asked to choose between pairings of affiliative and 
nonaffiliative behavioral alternatives (e.g., living with 
roommates versus living alone; seeing a film with someone 
versus seeing a film alone, etc.). As would be predicted, 
n Affiliation correlated more robustly with the operant 
behavioral criterion than did san Affiliation, while san 
Affiliation was more highly related to affiliative choice 
behavior than was n Affiliation. 
A second study conducted by Heckhausen and Halisch 
(1986) also supports the connection of implicit and self-
attributed motives to distinct behavioral domains. In 
this case, the focal construct was achievement motivation, 
defined as "a concern with doing things better, with 
surpassing standards of excellence" (McClelland et al., 
1953, p. 228). As in the previous study, implicit and 
self-attributed measures of this general motive content 
evidenced different behavioral correlates. Subjects' 
level of n Achievement predicted the successful 
initiation of job-related activities in the absence of 
explicit external guidelines. Where n Achievement 
predicted spontaneous behavioral trends, san Achievement 
was related both to setting high aspirational levels and 
to rating oneself as high in ability level on various 
questionnaires. Hence, san Achievement's net of 
correlates involved immediate choice behavior (i.e., 
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choosing an aspiration level from a list of alternatives) 
and subjects' thoughts about themselves, or verbal self-
image (i.e., attributing a high level of achievement 
traits to oneself}. 
Biernat (1989) has also reported a study that bears 
on the topic under discussion. Following assessment of 
both n Achievement and san Achievement, subjects were 
given the Wendt (1955) mental arithmetic task and were 
also asked about their willingness to serve as an 
organizer or leader on a subsequent task. Performance on 
the arithmetic task, which involves little mathematical 
ability but much mental effort, was seen as an operant 
criterion: Biernat (1989) comments: 
although there is an experimental demand to perform, 
how well subjects perform; how much effort and 
persistence they put into the task, are not dependent 
on any particular cue, but rather depend on the 
inclination of the subject for whom numerous 
behaviors are possible (e.g., concentrating very 
hard, letting the mind wander, setting a very low or 
a very high goal). (pp. 6-7) 
The question regarding willingness to lead, on the other 
hand, represents a respondent criterion, in that subjects 
are presented with a highly-structured stimulus (i.e., the 
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question) that, by social convention, implies clear 
response alternatives (i.e. , answering "Yes" or "No") . . As 
hypothesized, n Achievement predicted performance on the 
arithmetic task while being unrelated to responses to the 
leadership question. Conversely, san Achievement related 
positively to "Yes" responses on the leadership question 
while failing to relate to arithmetic performance. 
Although there is perhaps some question as to an 
externally-imposed mental arithmetic task's viability as a 
"pure" measure of operant behavior, these results, 
considered in tandem with those of Constantian and of 
Heckhausen and Halisch offer support for the contention 
that implicit and self-attributed motives exert their 
influences in distinct behavioral domains. 
Associated incentives. Four definitive experiments 
have sought to differentiate implicit from self-attributed 
motives based on the former's relation to behavioral 
incentives and the latter's to social incentives. For the 
first two of these, Koestner, Weinberger, McClelland, and 
Healy {1988) assessed subjects' levels of n Achievement, 
via the TAT, and san Achievement, via the PRF. All 
subjects next participated in an associate memory task 
(Experiment One) followed by a word-finding puzzle task 
(Experiment Two). In the memory task, subjects were 
assigned to either no-incentive or social-incentive 
conditions; in the latter condition, an experimenter 
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repeatedly mentioned ways to improve word recall. Stated 
differently, the experimenter introduced a verbal framing 
of the recall task as one with relevance to achievement. 
While the recall task pitted a social-incentive condition 
against a no-incentive condition, the second, puzzle task 
simply varied the level of task difficulty. For subjects 
high in n Achievement, the more difficult puzzles were 
expected to provide a behavioral incentive (i.e., the 
difficulty allows for an opportunity to feel a sense of 
accomplishment and success not afforded by simple puzzles) 
that would not be as germane for subjects low in 
n Achievement. 
A series of ANOVAS yielded confirmatory results in 
both the memory-task and puzzle-task experiments. In the 
memory experiment, a significant condition X san 
Achievement level interaction was obtained: subjects high 
in san achievement performed significantly better in the 
presence of a social achievement incentive than did those 
low in the motive, while they actually performed worse 
than low-achievement subjects in the absence of a social 
incentive. No such relationships occurred in the first 
experiment when subjects were divided into high- and low-n 
Achievement groups; the performance of people high in 
n Achievement was not affected by the presence of a social 
incentive. ANOVAs conducted in the second, puzzle-task 
experiment reveal a significant difficulty X n Achievement 
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level interaction, such that subjects high in 
n Achievement showed relatively enhanced performance under 
the difficult condition, while low-achievement subjects 
showed the opposite pattern. Level of san Achievement did 
not interact with degree of difficulty in a significant 
way. Taken together, these results strongly support the 
contention that implicit motives are tied to behavioral 
incentives, or incentives embedded in doing the task, 
while self-attributed motives are tied to social 
incentives--at least in the case of achievement 
motivation. 
A third experiment (Koestner et al., 1988) has 
examined the above types of relationships as they apply to 
power motivation, which is defined as a "desire to have 
impact on others by influencing, persuading, helping, 
arguing with, or attacking them" (McClelland et al., 1989, 
p. 694). In this study, n Power was assessed using the 
popular TAT method (Winter, 1973), while san Power was 
assessed using the Dominance scale from Jackson's (1984) 
PRF. Following motive assessment, all subjects worked on 
a social perception task (Sternberg, 1986), which involved 
viewing a series of pictures of two people and determining 
the relationship between the two for each picture. For 
half of the pictures, subjects were asked to judge the 
power relationship in the dyad--to determine which of the 
two people was the boss over the other; for the remaining 
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pictures, subjects judged the dyadic affiliative 
relationship between the two people (e.g., lovers, friends, 
etc.). Hence, half of the pictures involved a 
behavioral power incentive, while the other half featured 
a behavioral incentive unrelated to power. A further 
methodological twist in this study involved the 
introduction of a social power incentive to half of the 
participants: while half of the subjects were simply told 
how to perform the social perception task, the others were 
additionally told that performance on the task as a whole 
(i.e., not just on the pictures involving power 
relationships) was related to managerial and persuasive 
abilities. 
As with the experiments on achievement motivation, 
this power-focused study yielded relevant, confirmatory 
results. First, n Power was related to enhanced 
performance on the power-related pictures only, and there 
was no n__Power level by social incentive condition 
interaction: introduction of a social power incentive did 
not differentially affect those high in n Power over those 
low in n Power. Second, san Power did not predict a 
relatively better performance on power-oriented pictures 
than on affiliation-related pictures. Subjects high in 
san Power, in other words, evidenced no special 
motivational investment in construing or processing power-
related interpersonal scenarios. San Power did, however, 
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interact with social power incentive condition, such that 
high-san Power participants performed better than low-san 
power participants when the social incentive was 
introduced. Furthermore, this "social incentive effect" 
held for power-related and affiliation-related pictures 
alike. For san-motivated individuals·, it seems, an 
activity's relation to a motivational content is 
irrelevant. Instead, it is the explicit, verbal 
association of any activity to the concept of "power," 
"achievement," etc. that causes an increased investment in 
the activity. 
In contrast to the last experiment, a final 
experiment conducted by Koestner and Zuckerman (1989) 
suggests that while san-motivated individuals are 
apparently oblivious to the rewards inherent in different 
types of activity, they are, unlike implicitly motivated 
individuals, actually quite sensitive to fine distinctions 
between social incentive types. After assessing 
n Achievement, n Power, san Achievement, and san Power in 
the standard ways, Koestner and Zuckerman had participants 
work on a word maze. Subjects' work was interrupted by an 
experimenter who gave each participant either achievement-
oriented performance feedback or power-related performance 
feedback. The achievement feedback focused on mastery, or 
how much of the task a subject had completed, while the 
power feedback focused on competition, or how well the 
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subject was doing relative to others. Following feedback, 
participants were informed that the experiment was over 
and were left to do as they pleased. Their subsequent 
persistence on the word maze task was then measured. For 
subjects high in san Achievement, a greater percentage 
evidenced task persistence following mastery feedback than 
did following competitive feedback. In the case of 
subjects high in san Power, the reverse was true: more 
subjects persisted following competitive feedback than did 
following mastery feedback. No such relationships were 
obtained for subjects high in n Achievement or n Power. 
While implicitly-motivated individuals are unaffected by 
verbally-presented incentives, then, it appears that san-
motivated people respond to motive-consistent feedback 
with an enhanced behavioral investment in the activity at 
hand (i.e., the motive's energizing function). The 
combined results of the four experiments just discussed 
allow for at least some preliminary validation of the 
contention that implicit motives are tied to behavioral 
incentives while self-attributed motives are linked with 
social incentives. 
Developmental origins. The evidence for the 
grounding of implicit and self-attributed motives in 
different sorts of developmental experiences is limited to 
a single longitudinal study conducted by McClelland and 
Pilon (1983). When the study's participants were five 
34 
years old, their mothers were exhaustively interviewed on 
their child-rearing practices. Twenty-six years later, 
the participants were administered TAT measures of n 
Achievement, n Power, and n Affiliation and Adjective 
checklist (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983) measures of these three 
constructs' self-attributed counterparts. Analysis of 
relationships between specific child-rearing practices and 
adult motivational constitution revealed a number of 
significant correlations. In the domain of achievement 
motivation, n Achievement correlated positively with 
regularly scheduled feeding and with the severity of 
toilet training, while san Achievement correlated with 
early task setting by parents. McClelland et al. (1989) 
reason that these findings are consistent with implicit 
motives' proposed grounding in early, prelinguistic 
affective experiences and self-attributed motives' basis 
in explicit, verbal dealings with significant others. 
First, toilet training was typically completed during the 
first 19 months of life for this cohort, such that lingual 
comprehension would not have permitted a predominantly 
verbal coding of the experience. Additionally, teaching a 
child to master hunger states through scheduled feeding 
certainly involves less verbal-conceptual interchange than 
does explicitly outlining the tasks that a child is to 
perform. It is proposed, then that parental rigor in the 
areas of feeding and toilet training simply provided 
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children with more opportunities to experience the 
pleasure inherent in mastering internal states. The 
setting of early tasks to master, on the other hand, was 
more aligned with verbal-conceptual structuring (i.e., 
explicitly outlining the achievement task) and extrinsic, 
more abstract rewards (i.e., verbalized praise). 
McClelland and Pilon also garnered relevant results 
in the case of power motivation. Here, parental 
permissiveness around sexual and aggressive play predicted 
adult n Power. "Permissiveness" in this case can be 
equated with parents' allowing or ignoring behavior 
(McClelland et al., 1989); hence, it appears that implicit 
motive development was encouraged by the parental 
provision of a nondirective environment--one that allowed 
for the child's unconstrained and repeated experiencing of 
the pleasures attendant to having impact on others. In 
the case of san Power, both punishment of aggression 
directed at parents and frequency of mother-administered 
spankings were predictive of adult motive strength. 
McClelland et al. (1989) frame these relationships as 
confirmatory, noting that "spanking and punishment for 
aggression are usually accompanied by explicit statements 
forbidding the child to do something and explaining why he 
or she is being spanked for violating a prohibition" (pp. 
699-700). The researchers contend that it is the child's 
internalization of the verbal accompaniments to the 
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punishments that facilitates san motive development. 
While this explanation seems somewhat plausible, it does 
not explain the relationship of san motive development to 
punishment. It is plausible that the san motive develops 
through an identification with the aggressor--with the 
parents' display of power. However, a bevy of equally 
plausible, theory-inconsistent explanations are also 
available. It is, for example, possible that a self-
attributed desire to dominate develops as a compensation 
for early experiences of being dominated by more powerful 
others. 
The results for the affiliative motives are, like 
those for power motivation, inconsistently conclusive. 
The sole significant correlate of adult n Affiliation was 
a lack of maternal responsiveness to the infant's crying, 
while adult san Affiliation was related to mothers' 
repeated teachings that the child should "not fight back." 
The latter finding is quite supportive: explicit parental 
teachings that one should be nice and not fight predict 
the development of affiliative self-constructs as tapped 
by a self-ascriptive affiliative questionnaire. The 
finding for n Affiliation, however, is less clear. It can 
be speculated that children who were allowed to suffer 
longer prior to receiving maternal attention experienced a 
more strong positive affective reaction when the contact 
did finally arrive; repeated experiencings of this 
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distress-followed-by-interpersonal-relief scenario could 
lay the affective-experiential groundwork for motive 
development. However, alternate explanations of this 
finding are clearly possible. McClelland et al., (1989) 
actually diverge from their own theory of implicit motive 
acquisition in interpreting this finding, suggesting that 
n Affiliation may have it's affective genesis in feelings 
of anxiety rather than in pleasurable affective 
experiences. Specifically, they contend that early 
experiences of insecurity in the maternal relationship 
crystallize into an "implicit fear of rejection" 
(McClelland et al., 1989, p. 700), which persists into 
adulthood and is related to n Affiliation (Koestner & 
McClelland, 1990). 
In conclusion, only a few partially supportive 
findings have related implicit and self-attributed motives 
with specific, distinct developmental origins. Some of 
the relationships obtained by McClelland and Pilon (1983) 
are compelling, as in the linkings of parental 
permissiveness to adult n Power and of explicit 
instructions to "not fight back" to adult 
san Affiliation. It is also noteworthy that in no case 
did an implicit motive and a self-attributed motive share 
a parenting correlate; the two motive types do appear to 
have distinct developmental roots. These immediately 
convincing findings, however, are accompanied by a series 
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of less conclusive results--results less readily 
assimilable by McClelland et al's, (1989) developmental 
propositions. Furthermore, both the compelling and less 
compelling explanations advanced for obtained 
relationships are all post-hoc. Clearly, more research 
must occur in this area before more definitive conclusions 
can be reached. 
Measurement of Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives 
Operant and respondent measures. The previously-
discussed functional differences between implicit and 
self-attributed motives influence the types of measures 
used to assess them. Not surprisingly, self-attributed 
motives are best-assessed by respondent measures, which 
sample choice behavior under highly-structured, explicit 
situations (McClelland, 1980). Two of the most widely 
used respondent measures of self-attributed motives are 
Jackson's (1984) Personality Research Form (PRF) and Gough 
and Heilbrun's (1980) Adjective Check List (ACL). The 
former requires the test-taker.to respond "True" or 
"False" to a number of self-statements (e.g., "I am quite 
effective in getting others to agree with me"), while the 
latter simply asks the test-taker to endorse or not 
endorse a series of potentially self-descriptive 
adjectives. As exemplified by the PRF and ACL, respondent 
measures generally constrain the test-taker, specifying 
both the stimulus, in this case a test question, and the 
range of possible responses to the stimulus. They also 
engender "consistency and social desirability sets" 
(McClelland, 1980, p. 36), asking how the subject 
generally feels or generally is. In fact, some have 
cautioned that respondent questionnaires may tap 
self-presentations rather than self-reports (Hogan & 
Nicholson, 1988). 
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Unlike self-attributed motives, implicit motives are 
best-assessed via operant measures, or instruments that 
sample spontaneously-generated, unconstrained behavior 
(McClelland, 1980). The most popular operant measures in 
implicit motive research involve the Thematic Apperception 
Test (TAT): subjects are asked to tell imaginative 
stories to pictures of vague interpersonal scenarios. 
These stories (i.e., samples of operant behavior) are then 
rigorously scored for the presence of various motive-
related themes. In the case of n Intimacy, for example, 
subjects' imaginative stories are scored for thematic 
categories such as Dialogue, Commitment or Concern, and 
Harmony (McAdams, 1979). Operant measures, unlike 
respondent instruments, provide little in the way of 
explicit task structure. In other words, there is no 
specific test question and no specific set of responses; 
the test-taker operates on the test, rather than 
responding to it. Operant measures also leave the social 
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implications accompanying various responses undefined. 
The comparative absence of explicitly-defined social 
meanings, in turn, allows for a relative circumvention of 
self-conscious processing. McClelland et al. (1989), for 
example, note, "the imaginative stories from which 
implicit motives are coded reflect motivational and 
emotional themes in the person's life, unevaluated as to 
their appropriateness in terms of concepts of the self, 
others, and what is important" (p. 698). Operant measures 
are finally distinguished from respondent measures based 
on the response sets that they encourage. Rather than 
consistency sets, operant measures create variability 
sets, or tacit demands for variable responding, via 
instructions that emphasize imagination and creativity 
(McClelland, 1980). 
Reliability issues. The most biting criticisms of 
TAT motive measures involve their reliability, estimates 
of which typically reside well below the range accepted by 
traditional psychometric criteria. Entwisle (1972), for 
example, in an analysis of both published and unpublished 
TAT n Achievement data, estimated the measure's 
homogeneity reliability (i.e., internal consistency) to 
reside in the .30 to .40 range. Similarly low estimates 
have been obtained for various TAT measures' test-retest 
reliabilities, which range from an K of .10 to .35 
(McClelland, 1980). These psychometric shortcomings are 
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brought into even sharper relief by comparisons with well-
established self-report motive measures. The ACL scales 
for san Achievement, san Power, and san Affiliation, for 
example, boast internal consistencies of .84, .79, and 
.88, and test-retest reliabilities of .73, .76, and .63, 
respectively (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983). 
In examining reliability issues in motive 
measurement, McClelland (1980) has argued that the 
reliability figures associated with self-report motive 
measures are spuriously inflated. There are at least four 
ways through which motive questionnaires, rather than the 
constructs they tap, may pull for exaggerated reliability 
coefficients. First, the instructions accompanying most 
self-report measures communicate an implicit consistency 
demand through instructions like "answer honestly," and 
"state your true feelings." These sorts of guidelines 
discourage possible construct-driven inconsistencies, 
allying contradictory responses with concepts of 
"dishonesty" and "wishy-washiness." Second, self-report 
measures often tap generalized response sets in addition 
to the targeted motive construct. These sets can lead to 
consistently_positive or negative responses regardless of 
item content (Edwards, 1957; Couch & Keniston, 1960). 
Third, self-report measures gain non construct-related 
consistency by 
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asking the same question in many different 
ways ... as D'Andrade (1965) has demonstrated, there is 
so much semantic overlap among the adjectives used 
in different descriptions that the subjects cannot 
really discriminate what is being asked. They are 
answering the same question, semantically speaking, 
over and over again, and it is the psychologist who 
has been fooled into thinking that he has established 
response consistency, when the subject cannot tell 
one stimulus from another. (McClelland, 1980, p. 32) 
A final contributor to self-report measures' inflated 
reliabilities is their frequent inclusion of questions 
concerning past behavior. Unless the subject blatantly 
malingers, it is doubtful that responses will change, even 
if the construct targeted by the question has. McClelland 
{1980) concludes, "The most reasonable inference to be 
made from these facts is that the true reliability of 
characteristics measured in the usual type of personality 
questionnaires ... is unknown" (p.31). 
While there is evidence that reliability estimates 
are spuriously high in the case of self-report measures, 
there is actually reason to believe that reliability 
estimates for TAT motive measures are artificially 
deflated. Standard TAT instructions prime subjects to be 
creative and imaginative. To the degree that a subject 
heeds these instructions, it is improbable that a series 
of consecutive stories will address the same thematic 
content, even if there is an implicit-motive press for 
thematic repetition. There is nothing creative or 
original about copying one's own stories. In fact, a 
"sawtooth effect" has been identified in TAT achievement 
stories (Atkinson, 1950): it is normative for 
consecutively written TAT stories to alternate between a 
relative presence and relative absence of achievement 
themes. Notably, the test-retest reliability estimates 
associated with TAT measures improve substantially when 
creativity sets are eliminated through altered 
instructions. Winter and Stewart (1977), for example, 
told subjects not to worry about similarities between 
previously written TAT stories and stories written on a 
second TAT administration. They obtained a test-retest 
coefficient of .58 for n Power. Comparable effects have 
been reported in the case of n Achievement (Heckhausen, 
Schmalt, & Schneider, 1985) and n Intimacy (Lundy, 1980). 
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The just-discussed measure-based explanations for 
operant and respondent measures' discrepant reliabilities 
are supplemented by construct-based explanations. In 
particular, presses toward consistency are probably 
inherent in the self-attributed motive system itself 
(Guidano & Liotti, 1983). Subjects may attach consistency 
demands to respondent self-report tasks, then, even in the 
absence of bias-fostering instructions. Furthermore, 
self-attributed motives are intimately linked with social 
presentation. Hence, it somewhat befits the construct 
that self-presentational factors should influence test 
scores. In conclusion, some of the factors that 
44 
McClelland (1980) frames as reliability-inflating 
measurement artifacts may actually be indigenous aspects 
of self-attributed motives. This argument, however, only 
applies to some of McClelland's criticisms. Implicit 
consistency demands and generalized response sets may be 
"in the motive" rather than "in the measure." On the 
other hand, self-report measures' inclusion of 
semantically interchangeable items and use of past-focused 
questions certainly reflect unwanted measure-based bias. 
There are also theory-based reasons why implicit 
motive measures should not exhibit high reliabilities. 
McClelland (1980) asserts that implicit motives function 
according to an alternative manifestations model. 
The crux of this idea is that implicit motives, to the 
extent that they express themselves one way in a 
behavioral episode, will be less apt to express themselves 
in another way at that time. To the extent that n Power 
is expressed by telling a TAT story about an argument, for 
example, there will be less of a press to tell a 
relational exploitation story to another TAT card. 
In other words, "the alternative manifestations are not 
highly intercorrelated as the consistency hypothesis 
assumes they should be" (McClelland, 1980, p. 32). The 
varying of operant responses (i.e., alternation behavior) 
is furthermore assumed by general behavior theory to have 
both adaptive value and evolutionary basis; behavioral 
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variability may be hard-wired into the implicit system. 
In fact, Atkinson (1981) has argued that phenotypic 
expressions of unobservable, genotypic implicit motive 
dispositions are systematically inconsistent, rather than 
random and incoherent. 
A final construct-based reason for TAT motive 
measures' low reliability concerns the dimension of 
sensitivity. Implicit motives are proposed to be 
extremely sensitive to fluctuations in internal and 
situational states. The influences of such uncontrollable 
factors as random daily events, reactions to the 
experimenter and other subjects, mood during test 
administration, and degree of recent motive satisfaction 
all interact with stable motive dispositions to yield 
obtained motive scores. In other words, there is a 
relatively low "signal to noise ratio" when TAT measures 
are used to assess stable motivational traits. It is 
worth mentioning that this is not the case with the 
measurement of self-attributed motives. To the degree 
that the subject is a stable, well-integrated person, 
daily fluctuations in internal and external environments 
will not precipitate marked fluctuations in the self-
image. Furthermore, self-report measures' concern with 
how subjects generally behave or generally feel helps 
preclude extraneous influences. 
McClelland has argued passionately that estimates of 
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TAT measures' reliabilities are spuriously deflated while 
reliability values for self-report motive measures are_ 
inflated. Cogent speculation, however, must not be 
confused with empirical support: McClelland and his 
associates have offered no empirical evidence that self-
report measures' reliability suffers when certain 
measurement artifacts are removed. It may well be that 
both measure types' "true" reliabilities reside in the 
moderate range. Nonetheless, it is equally probable that 
when all measurement artifacts are removed, questionnaire 
motive measures are still more reliable instruments than 
TAT motive measures. In fact, it is theoretically 
warranted to expect that even with the elimination of all 
confounds, respondent measures are more reliable than 
operant instruments. This follows from the self-
attributed system's alliance with consistency and self 
presentation, as well as the implicit system's tendencies 
toward sensitivity and behavioral alternation. 
Validity issues. TAT motive measures, particularly 
the TAT measure for n Achievement, have also been 
criticized on validity grounds (Entwisle, 1972; Klinger, 
1966). Indeed TAT-assessed motive studies are prone to 
inconsistently supportive findings and to difficulties 
with replication (McClelland, 1980). Klinger (1966), for 
example, concluded that n Achievement "scores are shown to 
be correlated with performance measures in (only) about 
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l/2 of the studies reported" (p. 291). In defending the 
validity of TAT motive measures, McClelland (1980) invokes 
their aforementioned sensitivity, which is actually 
desirable from a construct validity perspective, as a 
major contributor to variable findings. Due to implicit 
motives' sensitivity, TAT studies are much more prone than 
questionnaire studies to situational interferences. 
McClelland (1980) cautions, "much more care must be taken 
when operant measures are used to insure that testing 
conditions are standardized, neutral with regard to 
arousing cues, and the same for all subjects tested" (p. 
35). Without such care, he asserts, experimental 
lackluster will masquerade as validational deficit. While 
McClelland's argument again makes sense, it is also a 
particularly convenient "escape hatch" for nonsupportive 
findings: whenever TAT measures fail to predict a 
behavioral criterion, spurious, unnoticed situational 
factors can be retrospectively identified. 
Entwisle (1972), in a particularly damaging critique, 
has also condemned the TAT measure of n Achievement on the 
grounds that it does not often predict academic 
performance. This appraisal does seem misguided, in that 
grades are not an apt validity criterion: a 
straightforward relationship between n Achievement and 
something as multi-determined as school performance has 
never been posited by motive researchers. McClelland et 
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al. (1953), in fact, explicitly cautioned investigators 
against expecting such a simple linear relationship from 
the outset. As it turns out, TAT-assessed n Achievement 
does predict scholastic excellence, but only when certain 
achievement fostering situational elements are present, 
i.e., autonomy-supportive context, provision of moderate 
challenge, frequent performance feedback (Koestner & 
McClelland, 1990; McKeachie, 1961; O'Connor, Atkinson, & 
Horner, 1966). In other situations, n Power and even n 
Affiliation have been found to predict academic success 
(McKeachie, 1961). 
While operant motive measures suffer from erratic 
relationships to validational criteria, McClelland (1980) 
contends that respondent motive measures suffer from 
consistent covariance with criteria of only questionable 
worth. Popular self-report motive measures typically cite 
three types of validity data. These involve correlations 
between the measure of interest and (1) scores on 
instruments measuring similar constructs, (2) behaviors 
specifically covered by the questionnaire, and (3) peer 
ratings (Scott & Johnson, 1972). All three of these 
sources are problematic in that they allow ample 
opportunity for predictor-criterion contamination, and 
hence, foster spuriously inflated validity estimates 
(McClelland, 1980). In the case of the first validity 
source, criterion scales often share items with the 
predictor scale, in addition to sharing (desirable) 
conceptual similarity. To the degree that item overlap 
is responsible for obtained correlations, evidence of 
reliability, but certainly not validity, is garnered. 
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In other words, predictor-criterion contamination has 
occurred. A similar problem occurs when a measure of an 
abstract concept (e.g., san Power, san Intimacy) contains 
items that specifically address a behavioral validity 
criterion. Consider the case, for example, where a power 
measure containing the item, "I often find myself in 
positions of power over others" is significantly 
correlated with working as a manager: this sort of 
result, which essentially correlates something with 
itself, does not provide particularly convincing validity 
data. Finally, obtained correspondences between self-
reports and peer ratings may reflect only the tendency of 
peers to repeat statements that individuals make about 
themselves in the context of ongoing social interaction 
(McClelland, 1980). 
In summary, it is possible that validity estimates 
for operant measures are deflated due to an interaction 
between construct sensitivity and uncontrolled 
situational-experimental factors. Validity estimates for 
respondent motive measures, on the other hand, may be 
somewhat inflated by measure-criterion contamination. 
Story-based motive measures' perennial reputation as 
"black sheep" in the psychometric community is perhaps 
somewhat justified. However, closer examination of 
questionnaire measures' probable "true" validities, 
renders their validational superiority questionable. 
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Implicit and self-attributed variables are unrelated. 
McClelland et al. (1989) note that "measures of self-
attributed and implicit motives seldom correlate 
significantly with one another," adding that "few facts in 
psychology are as well established as this one" (p. 691). 
This general finding was first reported by McClelland et 
al. (1953), who found an absence of significant 
correlations between TAT and self-report measures of 
achievement motivation. This finding for achievement 
motivation has been replicated many times over (e.g., 
Atkinson & Litwin, 1960; Heckhausen, 1980; Heckhausen & 
Halisch, 1986, Holmes & Tyler, 1968). The finding has 
also been replicated in the cases of power motivation and 
intimacy motivation (Hoffman, 1989), and only weak, barely 
significant correlations have been obtained between TAT 
and questionnaire-assessed affiliation motivation 
(Constantian, 1982). As a recent illustration, of 
implicit and self-attributed constructs general lack of 
relationship, Koestner et al. (1988), in a two-experiment 
study, found the following pattern of nonsignificant 
correlations: (a) the pairing of n Achievement and san 
Achievement yielded correlation coefficients of -.21 and 
.15; (b) the corresponding values of an n Power with san 
Power correlation were .08 and .05; and finally, (c) the 
obtained n Affiliation with san Affiliation coefficients 
were -.06 and -.08. In this case, implicit motives were 
assessed using the usual TAT measures while the self-
attributed motives were assessed using PRF Achievement, 
Dominance, and Affiliation scales (Jackson, 1984). 
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Four major explanations address the lack of 
relationship between the two motive types. Some contend 
that there is really only one type of motive, and that the 
two types of motive measure do not correlate because TAT 
motive measures are psychometrically worthless (Entwisle, 
1972; Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Similarly, others have 
contended that the problem lies in self-report motive 
measures' faulty design (Raven, 1988). In fact, many have 
tried in vain to develop self-report motive measures, 
particularly of achievement motivation, that relate 
consistently to TAT motive measures (Edwards, 1954; Gough 
& Heilbrun, 1983; Jackson, 1974; Kreitler & Kreitler, 
1976; Raven, Molloy, & Corcoran, 1972). A third 
explanation grounded in measurement issues implicates 
neither of the two measures as "the culprit." As 
underscored by Campbell and Fiske {1959), every test score 
represents an amalgam of construct-related variance and 
method-related variance. It is possible, then, that TAT 
and self-report measures are both measuring the same 
construct, but that their shared construct variance is 
obscured by the contributions of extremely divergent 
method variances. 
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Unlike the preceding three explanations for the 
failure of TAT and self-report motive measures to 
intercorrelate, the final explanation, which guides the 
thrust of the present investigation, is grounded in 
construct-related considerations. Specifically, this 
argument, as advanced by McClelland et al. (1989), asserts 
that there is no fatal methodological flaw in either self-
report or TAT motive measures. Instead the measures do 
not correlate because they tap qualitatively different 
types of motives that are not necessarily in accord with 
each other. Koestner and McClelland (1990) reflect, 
"another way to react to this lack of correlation ... is to 
take it seriously, to insist that at a minimum, 
psychologists should not call by the same name two 
measures that do not correlate with each other" (p. 542). 
Against this backdrop, many of the presumed psychometric 
flaws in the measures (e.g., the TAT's low reliability, 
self-reports' failure to predict long-term trends in 
behavior, etc.) can be reframed as defining features of 
the constructs they tap. As already discussed, TAT 
measures should not show high test-retest reliability, 
since implicit motives are extremely sensitive to 
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environmental arousal; self-report measures, by the same 
token, should not predict long-term trends in behavior. in 
most cases, as self-attributed motives are only aroused in 
more circumscribed, socially-defined episodes. 
Interactions Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives. 
Theory and research. To assert that implicit and 
self-attributed motives comprise distinct motivational 
layers which need not be in accord is not to say that the 
two motive types do not interact. In fact, dynamic 
theorists such as Freud (1910) and Jung (1971) have gained 
much of their behavior-describing firepower by positing 
conscious and unconscious psychic levels in dynamic 
interplay. McClelland et al. (1989), perhaps following 
the lead of earlier psychodynamic theorists, propose a 
similar interplay between implicit and self-attributed 
systems. They comment: 
In evolutionary terms, a conscious motivational 
system has been built on top, so to speak, of a more 
primitive motivational system. The evolutionary 
advantage of such an arrangement is obvious because 
the more primitive, automatic motivational system is 
not well equipped to make plans or to set specific 
goals that take into account contextual 
circumstances ... self-attributed goals often serve to 
guide implicit motives into specific channels. 
(p. 699) 
The self-attributed system, then, is framed as a reality-
oriented "brains" that directs the implicit system's raw, 
behavior-driving and activity-sustaining "braun." Where 
the implicit personality presses for a continuing 
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succession of intrinsic pleasures (i.e., "What would feel 
good to do now?"), the self-attributed system mediates. 
implicit motive expression, taking into account perceived 
social constraints and incentives, as well as the 
implications of various behaviors for the self-image. 
Much as the psychodynamic ego sublimates unacceptable 
wishes into ego- and superego-syntonic gestures, self-
attributed motives are purported to channel implicit 
motive expression along identity-consistent lines. In 
more cognitive terms, the self-attributed system serves as 
a temporary override system to ongoing automatic 
functioning, allowing the verbal mediation of behavior 
vis-a-vis conscious motives and concerns (Bargh, 1984; 
Buck, 1985). 
A number of studies featuring achievement motivation 
provide support for the general proposition that self-
attributed motives mediate implicit motive expression. 
Patten and White (1977), for example, found that subjects 
in whom n Achievement had been aroused experimentally out-
performed controls on a digit symbol task. While the 
researchers reported that san Achievement had no similar 
effect on performance, McClelland (1985a), in a re-
presentation of the data, found that high san Achievement 
was in fact related to enhanced performance, but only for 
subjects high inn Achievement. Biernat's (1989) 
aforementioned study, which relied on "trait" 
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n Achievement rather than "state" n Achievement, 
replicates this finding. Once again, an implicit motive 
by self-attributed motive interaction was obtained, such 
that san Achievement related to enhanced performance on an 
operant mathematics task only for subjects high in 
n Achievement. In summary, it appears that conscious 
commitments toward accomplishment are associated with an 
enhanced ability to convert both situationally-aroused and 
dispositional implicit achievement press into operant 
performance. 
French and Lesser's (1964) study on women and 
achievement further illuminates the relationships between 
implicit and self-attributed motives. In this case, 
n Achievement predicted different operant behaviors 
depending on subjects' self-reported commitments to either 
a domestic role (i.e., wife and mother) or a career. For 
the former, n Achievement correlated significantly with 
doing better at a social task (i.e., generating a list of 
ways to make friends upon moving to a new community), 
while it was unrelated to performance on an academic task 
(i.e., solving anagrams). For career-oriented women, on 
the other hand, the reverse pattern was obtained: n 
Achievement correlated significantly with excelling at the 
academic task, while failing to relate to performance on 
the social task. Hence, san-like constructs seem to 
channel implicit motive expression into identity-
consistent operant domains while blocking motive 
expression in identity-inconsistent areas. 
Various results from Constantian's (1981) beeper 
study generalize the findings of achievement-focused 
studies to the domain of affiliation. First, 
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n Affiliation predicted frequency of affiliative activity 
in randomly-paged college students (K=.42), while 
san Affiliation and affiliative skills did not 
significantly predict the same criterion. Affiliation's 
predictive power, however, was boosted to an K of .60 when 
n Affiliation, san Affiliation, and affiliative skills 
were predictively combined via a multiple correlation 
technique. More decisively, self-reported interpersonal 
orientation was found to mediate n Affiliation's operant 
correlates. For subjects with an explicit commitment to 
affiliation (i.e., san Affiliation greater than san 
Autonomy), high n Affiliation was associated with a 
preference for taking walks with friends. For subjects 
explicitly committed to solitude (i.e., san Autonomy 
greater than san Affiliation) , n Affiliation was related 
to involvement in letter writing during random pagings--a 
sort of compromise behavior that allows implicit motive 
satisfaction within the bounds of the self-image's 
constraints. 
The results of the above studies are rendered more 
strongly supportive of a specific, directional 
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relationship between self-attributed and implicit motives 
by the repeated finding that implicit motives do not 
enhance self-attributed motives' prediction of respondent 
behavior. For example, in a multiple regression analysis 
of constantian's just-discussed data, McClelland (1985a) 
concluded, "The only significant contributor to predicting 
affiliative choices is (san) Affiliation: neither 
(implicit) motive nor perceived skill level nor their 
interaction is related to reports of liking to do things 
with friends" (p. 823). In Biernat's (1989) study, san 
Achievement was significantly related to the number of 
achievement-related statements selected as the "eight most 
appealing attributes" of a hypothetical person, chosen 
from a list of 21 statements. However, n Achievement was 
significantly related to the dependent measure for 
neither overall, high-san Achievement, nor low-san 
Achievement groups. In general, then, it seems that 
implicit motives do not exert a channeling effect on self-
attributed motives analagous to the empirically-supported 
mediating role that self-attributed motives adopt vis-a-
vis implicit presses (Biernat, 1989; McClelland, 1975a). 
CHAPTER III 
CONSTRUCTS GERMANE TO THE CLARIFICATION OF RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN IMPLICIT AND SELF-ATTRIBUTED MOTIVES 
As already noted, both measure-based and construct-
based explanations have been advanced to explain the 
failure of TAT and self-report motive measures to 
intercorrelate. One way to marshal support for the 
construct-based explanation, which is the primary goal of 
this study, would be to show that the two types of measure 
do in fact correlate, but only for certain people. 
Specifically, TAT and self-report measures should 
intercorrelate only for those individuals for whom 
implicit and self-attributed systems are in relative 
harmony. The a priori division of people into motive-
consistent and motive-inconsistent subgroups, then, should 
result in one group for whom the TAT and self-report 
motive measures are unrelated (or even correlate 
negatively) and another group for whom the two types of 
measure corroborate--if the construct-based explanation is 
correct. If measure-based explanations for TAT-
questionnaire incongruities are correct, however, no 
differential relationship should be obtained for motive-
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congruent and motive-incongruent groups. 
The present chapter concerns itself with inner-
directedness and other-directedness, two variables 
presumed to differentiate motive-congruent individuals 
from others. Additionally, personal strivings and 
personality abilities will be introduced, both of which 
may mediate relationships between self-attributed and 
implicit systems. All four of these constructs will 
permit further examination of the relationships between 
implicit and self-attributed motives. 
Inner-Directedness 
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Inner-directedness refers to a general proclivity 
toward focusing one's attention inwardly and 
intrapsychically, rather than outwardly and socially. 
Wymer and Penner (1985) define the construct as a tendency 
to "be aware of and attentive to internal dispositions" 
(p. 1004). Actually, inner-directedness, which is a 
factor-analytically derived dimension, is composed of two 
defining facets--private self consciousness (Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975) and personal identity (Cheek & 
Briggs, 1982). The former facet concerns a tendency 
to direct one's attention toward one's motives, feelings, 
thoughts, and behavioral dispositions (Scheier, Buss, & 
Buss, 1978), while the latter involves an imbuing of the 
self-knowledge gained from this internal focus 
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with self-definitional import. Taken in tandem, private 
self consciousness and personal identity make for an 
individual who (1) knows his or her inner, organismic self 
and (2) expresses that self via self-image, word, and 
choice. From a contemporary motivational perspective, 
inner-directedness should mediate congruence between 
implicit and self-attributed layers: a focus on implicit 
experience, with a concomitant commitment to the 
incorporation of such experience into the self-image 
should, over time, lead to a schematic identity that fits 
the implicit "facts." Inner-directedness, in other words, 
should foster the self-attributed system's accommodation 
to experiential realities. McClelland et al. (1989), in 
fact, implicate self-conscious processes in the 
equilibrating of implicit and self-attributed systems, 
speculating that "systematic experience-based self 
observation ... may bring the two types of motives into 
alignment" (p. 700). 
The speculation that inner-directedness should foster 
motive congruence is supported by Wymer and Penner's 
(1985) finding that inner-directedness mediates the 
prediction of operant behavior from self-report. In an 
initial session, subjects took a battery of measures 
assessing various mediator variables, including inner-
directedness. Their attitudes toward religion (i.e., a 
san-like construct) were also assessed via Thurstone and 
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chave's (1929} Attitudes Toward the Church Scale and 
zanna, Olson, and Fazio's (1980) measure of religious 
attitudes. One month later, subjects filled-out a 
comprehensive, retrospective inventory of their recent 
involvement or non-involvement in various religious 
behaviors. Hence, at least to the degree that responses 
were accurate, the measure tapped religious trends in 
(largely) operant behavior. As predicted, subjects high 
in inner-directedness showed a greater correspondence 
between value and behavior scores than did their less 
inner-directed peers. In other words, inner-directed 
individuals' views of themselves mirror, in relative 
terms, the flavor of their implicitly-motivated behavior. 
The framing of inner-directedness as a determinant of 
motive congruence is further supported by a wealth of data 
concerning its private self-consciousness facet. Private 
self-consciousness, like inner directedness, is related to 
enhanced congruence between self-reports and behavior. 
Scheier et al. (1978), for example, assessed subjects' 
degree of private self-consciousness and san 
Aggressiveness. Weeks later, subjects' actual 
aggressiveness was measured via an "aggression machine" 
paradigm (Buss, 1961, 1963), in which subjects served as 
teachers to pupils (actually experimental confederates) in 
a concept formation task. "Aggressiveness" was 
operationalized as the average intensity of bogus shocks 
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administered by teachers as punishment for errors made on 
learning trials. As predicted, the overall correlation 
between san Aggressiveness and behavior differed markedly 
for subjects high and low in private self-consciousness. 
While the former evidenced a highly significant self-
report/behavior correlation, the latter's behavior did not 
correspond at all to their self-attributed aggressiveness. 
While the dependent variable in this study did involve 
choice behavior (i.e., choosing between various shock 
magnitudes), participants were in no way made aware of 
the implications of shock administration for their san 
Aggressiveness (i.e., there was no social aggression 
incentive). In fact, the task was, if anything, 
explicitly allied with achievement (i.e., being an 
effective teacher). Hence, this study seemed to involve 
behavior residing in a middle position on the operant-
respondent continuum. Turner (1978c, Experiment One), 
employing a more definitively operant behavioral 
criterion, has replicated Scheier et al 1 s. general 
findings. In this study, power was the focal attribute, 
operationalized as degree of conversational domination in 
a problem-solving group. As predicted, private self-
consciousness mediated the correspondence between a 
previously-obtained measure of san Power and the operant 
power criterion. High private self-conscious subjects, 
then, evidence a more robust self-report/behavior 
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correlation than low self-conscious subjects. 
A number of studies have additionally linked private 
self-consciousness to (1) an enhanced awareness of one's 
affective state and (2) a subsequent expression of this 
state in behavior. Scheier (1976), for example, employed 
the aforementioned aggression machine paradigm with a 
twist: prior to the teaching phase, confederate-pupils 
watched teacher-subjects perform a difficult puzzle task. 
While the confederates observed quietly for control 
subjects, they actively badgered and insulted the 
experimental subjects, thus inducing anger. For low 
private self-conscious subjects, neither average shock 
intensity nor self-reports of post-experimental anger 
differed between experimental and control conditions. 
Experimental high self-conscious subjects, however, 
reported significantly more anger and also administered a 
higher mean shock level than did high self-conscious 
controls. Hence, high-self conscious subjects seem to be 
both more aware of their angry reactions and more willing 
to let these reactions guide their behavior. 
Subsequent studies have found private self-
consciousness to mediate other types of affective 
experiences as well. Scheier and Carver (1977), for 
example, had male undergraduates rate either arousing 
slides of nude women or disgusting slides of human 
atrocities "according to how much of a bodily reaction 
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(they) seemed to be having" (p. 628). In another 
experiment, the researchers had subjects rate their mood 
following induction of either elation or depression via 
velten's (1968) previously validated procedure. In all 
analyses, private self-consciousness was positively 
related to more elevated affect-based ratings, whether the 
induced affect was attraction, repulsion, elation, or 
depression. This "self-consciousness effect" has also 
been found in regard to the experience of sympathy 
(Scheier, Carver, & Shulz, 1978, Experiment Two): high 
private self-conscious individuals show more compassion 
for a handicapped target person than do others, as 
reflected in more favorable overall evaluations. 
A final relevant study suggests that private self-
consciousness is related to a relative focus on internal 
cues and away from social cues and pressures. More 
specifically, Scheier, Carver, and Gibbons (1979) found 
high private self-conscious subjects to attend more to 
internal sensory cues and less to socially-provided 
expectancies in judging the taste of various solutions. 
Moreover, these taste-judgements were made on a respondent 
scale; private self-consciousness, then, was related to 
the self-attributed system's relative reorientation from 
social presses to internal promptings. 
While validity data abounds on private self-
consciousness, as assessed by Fenigstein et als. 1 (1975) 
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self-Consciousness Scale, validity data pertaining to 
inner directedness' second facet, personal identity, is 
restricted to the Personal Identity Scale's (Cheek & 
Briggs, 1982) face validity. This instrument requires 
subjects to rate six items on a five-point Likert scale (0 
= "Not at all important to my sense of who I am;" 5 = 
Extremely important to my sense of who I am."). Specific 
items address intrapersonal phenomena such as "emotions 
and feelings," "dreams and imagination," and "thoughts and 
ideas." While private self-consciousness concerns both an 
awareness of the organismic self and a tendency toward 
behavioral expression of this self, personal identity 
seems more concerned with a reorienting of the self-
attributed system, or self-image, to fit internal reality. 
The person high in both dimensions, then, should show an 
enhanced consistency between operant and respondent 
behaviors. 
Other-Directedness 
A second construct that should, assuming the 
correctness of McClelland et al's. {1989) theory, mediate 
TAT/self-report congruence is other-directedness. This 
factor-analytically derived construct subsumes two facets. 
These are other-focus, or a "willingness to change one's 
behavior to please others" (Wymer & Penner, 1985, p. 1003) 
and situational variability, or a tendency toward 
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"situational instability in trait-related behaviors" 
(Wymer & Penner, 1985, p. 1003). The former is assessed 
via several items from Snyder's (1974) factorially complex 
self-Monitoring Scale (SMS), which requires subjects to 
rate self-statements as "true" or "false." Analysis of 
these items suggests a high-scorer who is keenly attuned 
to social incentives and invested in pleasing others 
(e~g., "In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be 
what people expect me to be rather than anything else." 
<True>; "When I am uncertain how to act in a social 
situation, I look to the behavior of others for cues" 
<True>). The situational variability facet is measured by 
Bern and Allens' (1974) three-item Situational Variability 
Scale (SVS), which requires test-takers to rate their 
cross-situational variability on traits of sociability, 
conscientiousness, and helpfulness. This scale, then, 
implicates variation in "situations," rather than changes 
in internal press, as the culprit for behavioral 
variability. Furthermore, these behavior-influencing 
situations are predominantly social; helping, socializing, 
and some aspects of conscientiousness (e.g., punctuality) 
cannot occur in a vacuum. It is hence assumed that high 
scorers on the SVS will be strongly oriented, at the self-
attributed level, toward social demands while being 
relatively ignorant of their implicit dispositions. 
A precious few studies suggest that other-
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directedness and its facets are detrimental to the self-
attributed system's alignment with implicit realities. 
First, Wymer and Penner's (1985) aforementioned study of 
religious values and behaviors examined the mediating 
effects of other-directedness. As expected, subjects low 
in other-directedness showed a significantly greater 
correlation between san Religiosity and subsequent 
religious behavior than did other subjects. Although the 
SMS has undergone extensive validational research, none of 
these efforts have considered the other-focus factor 
independently. As the SMS is composed of multiple factors 
(i.e., other-focus, acting, and extraversion) that often 
have opposing behavior-mediating effects, it would be 
misleading to cite global SMS research in examining the 
other-focus factor's effects (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; 
Gabreyna & Arkin, 1980; Wymer & Penner, 1985). Other-
directedness' situational variability facet, however, has 
been researched in a single, well-devised study. In a 
pretest session, Bern and Allen (1974) measured subjects' 
§fill Friendliness and san Conscientiousness via self-
report, as well as their variability on each dimension. 
San Friendliness predicted the spontaneous initiation of 
conversation--an operant behavioral criterion, only for 
subjects low in situational variability. Situational 
variability effects were also obtained in the case of 
conscientiousness: situational stability significantly 
enhanced san Conscientiousness' prediction of two out of 
three operant criteria (i.e., promptness in returning a. 
series of questionnaires by mail and number of assigned 
course readings completed at mid-semester). 
Personal Strivings 
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Personal strivings reflect, along with life tasks 
(Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987), personal projects (Little, 
1983), and current concerns (Klinger, 1977, 1987), 
personality psychology's recent reinvestment in 
motivational constructs (Emmons, 1989). Strivings have 
previously been defined as "idiographic instantiations of 
major (implicit) motives, such as achievement, 
affiliation, intimacy, and power" (Emmons & McAdams, 
1989). Further clues as to strivings' theoretical nature 
come from the way in which they are assessed. Personal 
strivings are operationalized as responses to a striving 
list, which requires subjects to generate between 10 and 
20 written rejoinders to the stem, "I typically try to ... " 
(Emmons, 1989, p. 96). Notably, the striving list task 
straddles the operant-respondent assessment continuum. 
Striving lists resemble operant measures in that (1) 
specific responses are not provided, and (2) the social 
incentives attached to various subject-generated responses 
remain undefined. On the other hand, striving lists are 
similar to respondent questionnaires in their invocation 
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of verbal, self-reflexive thought: strivings represent 
subjects' conceptualizations about their actions rather 
than their spontaneous, artless behavior itself. The full 
striving assessment procedure, as employed by Emmons 
(1989), also has subjects make a number of judgments and 
ratings of their strivings following list generation; the 
various resultant variables (e.g., valence, ambivalence, 
past attainment, probability of success, etc.) are, 
however, beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
Emmons has also developed a coding system that allows for 
the assignment of individual strivings to various thematic 
groupings, such as achievement, intimacy, and power. Via 
this assignment, idiographic strivings (e.g., "I typically 
try to understand others;" "I typically try to dominate in 
conversation."), much like idiosyncratic TAT stories, can 
be recategorized into nomothetic constructs (e.g., 
intimacy strivings, or 2 Intimacy, and power strivings, or 
2 Power) and be quantified. 
Much as they straddle operant and respondent 
measurement categories, personal strivings, when examined 
against the backdrop of McClelland et al. 's (1989) bi-
level motivational theory, seem to occupy an interesting 
middle ground between implicit press and self-image. As 
already noted, Emmons (1989) sees individual strivings as 
more circumscribed instantiations of pervasive implicit 
dispositions. In addition to being more focused than 
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implicit motives, strivings are conscious, verbal, and 
explicit. Hence, they can be imagined as emissaries 
between vast, silent implicit regions and more verbal 
governing bodies. Strivings personalize transpersonal 
implicit presses, such that autochthonous motives (e.g. 
"Dominate at every opportunity.") now feel familiar, ego-
syntonic, socially acceptable, and consistent with 
explicit, abstract goals (e.g., "Win the football game."). 
Personal strivings represent compromises or limited 
agreements between often discordant layers of personality. 
If the above premises are correct, then personal 
strivings should relate to both implicit and self-
attributed systems, even if the two systems are largely 
unrelated--or even in disharmony. Actually, Emmons and 
McAdams (1989) have garnered some initial, tentative 
support for this contention in an analysis of the 
intercorrelations between implicit motives (n Achievement, 
n Intimacy, and n Power) and their self-attributed and 
striving counterparts. In the case of achievement, our 
hypothesis was supported: significant correlations 
between both (1) n Achievement and § Achievement, and (2) 
E.fil1 Achievement and § Achievement seem more robust than 
the obtained correlation between n Achievement and san 
Achievement, although the relative strengths of 
correlation coefficients were not analyzed statistically. 
In the case of power, a more definitive picture emerged. 
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specifically, n Power - § Power and san Power - § Power 
pairings yielded significant positive correlations, while 
the n Power - san Power pairing suggested an almost 
complete absence of relationship. In the case of 
intimacy, the results were less conclusive. 
rt is clear that n Intimacy and § Intimacy are 
significantly related. Due to a low N in analyses 
involving san Nurturance (an intimacy-like construct), 
however, neither a significant, moderate n Intimacy with 
san Nurturance correlation nor a nonsignificant san 
Nurturance with § Intimacy correlation are particularly 
illuminating. In summary, then, Emmons and McAdams' 
(1989) analysis provides partial support for strivings' 
mediational role in relationships between implicit and 
self-attributed systems. Furthermore, a replication of 
their findings is clearly needed. 
Personality Abilities 
Like personal strivings, personality abilities are 
motive-like constructs that occupy a conceptual middle 
ground on the implicit/self-attributed continuum. Paulhus 
and Martin (1987) define a personality ability as "the 
degree of skill with which an individual can execute a 
particular social routine under optimal conditions" (p. 
355). While their term will be preserved, the present 
study conceives personality abilities to be more akin to 
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motivational traits than to skills: personality 
abilities, as assessed in the relevant research, seem less 
concerned with the success of, say, dominant behaviors and 
more concerned with the frequency and magnitude of 
attempts at domination. The personality ability concept 
follows from Wallace's (1967) suggestion that observed 
personality traits, or tendencies toward displaying 
certain types of behavior, represent an interaction 
between predispositions toward trait expression and trait 
inhibition. In the present terminology, then, it may be 
that self-attributed motives are composed of two 
components--a "pure" motive component, or personality 
ability, and an inhibition component. From this vantage, 
the personal ability would be closely allied with implicit 
dispositions, as a sort of verbal-conceptual accompaniment 
or reflection of organismic realities. The inhibitory 
component, on the other hand, would be allied with the 
self-image and related concerns of identity-management and 
social propriety. In interaction, the inhibitory 
component, but not the personality ability component, 
would serve to squelch both (1) the awareness and accurate 
self-report of implicit motive dispositions (as with 
repression, denial, etc.), and (2) the enactment of such 
dispositions under self-conscious situations. If these 
theoretical speculations are correct, then, personality 
abilities should relate more strongly to implicit motives 
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than do self-attributed motives. 
In trying to separate raw personality ability from. 
obscuring inhibition, Willerman, Turner, and Peterson 
(1976) have advocated the use of maximal measures. Rather 
than asking about the test-taker's typical behavior, 
maximal measures address the most extreme level of trait-
related behavior that the test-taker is capable of. 
standard respondent, self-report measures can be 
transformed into maximal measures by simply rewording the 
basic test question: instead of subjects being asked, 
"How friendly are you?," for example, they are now asked, 
"How friendly are you capable of being?" It is presumed 
that maximal measures largely circumvent response 
inhibition by side-stepping the issue of self-image. 
Maximal measures allow one to self-attribute a high degree 
of a personal ability without owning it (e.g., "I can be 
very competitive, but I am not necessarily a competitive 
person."). In more cognitive terms, maximal measures 
require a scanning of long-term memory for a most extreme 
exemplar of a behavioral trait expression. Motive 
questionnaires, on the other hand, require the invocation 
of abstract self-schemas. 
The premise that maximal questionnaires tap a motive-
like index that is relatively unconfounded with inhibitory 
anxiety has as yet to be addressed empirically. Maximal 
instructions for laboratory behavior, however, do seem to 
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foster the disinhibition of behavioral dispositions. 
Klein and Willerman (1979), for example, found that the 
replacement of typical instructions (i.e., "Behave as you 
typically would") with maximal instructions (i.e., ''Be as 
dominant as you can") eliminated female subject's 
reluctances to behave dominantly toward a male: while 
women behaved more dominantly with female than with male 
confederates under typical instructions, they were equally 
dominant with both genders under maximal instructions. In 
a similar study, Turner (1983) found peers to rate 
socially anxious subjects as being significantly less 
dominant than other subjects under typical instructions. 
Under maximal instructions, however, peer ratings did not 
differ for anxious and nonanxious groups. To the extent 
that maximal measures have the same effect as maximal 
instructions for laboratory behavior, then, it appears 
that maximal methodologies are relatively successful in 
separating the effects of personality abilities from those 
of inhibition. 
There is an additional reason to believe that 
maximally-assessed personality abilities will relate more 
strongly to implicit motives than do self-attributed 
motives. As is readily evident from a perusal of 
McClelland et al.s' (1989) paper, the implicit motive 
system represents, among other things, a contemporary 
reframing of psychodynamic conceptions of "id" and 
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"unconscious.'' This theoretical heritage is evident, for 
example, in descriptions of the implicit system's 
automatic (i.e., unconscious) functioning and orientation 
toward intrinsic pleasures (i.e., pleasure principle). It 
is also probable that, as with the psychodynamic 
unconscious, notions of opposition are irrelevant at the 
implicit level. In other words, the coexistence of 
"dialectical'' implicit motives, like n Affiliation and 
n Autonomy, may not imply conflict or contradiction. 
Indeed, Atkinson (1981), in his account of implicit 
functioning, frames the stream of overt, spontaneous 
behavioral activity as reflecting the covert, unconflicted 
fluctuations and interactions of motive arousal levels. 
The consummation of one implicit aim, which is followed by 
a sort of motivational refractory period, allows for the 
nonconflictual expression of different and opposing 
implicit aims. 
At the self-attributed level, however, opposition is 
a relevant concept. In fact, factor analyses of self-
attributed motives suggest opposition to be a key 
ingredient in the conceptual glue that binds the self-
image. Paulhus and Martin (1987), for example, comment 
that "one of the.best established results in personality 
assessment is the circumplex structure of interpersonal 
traits" (p. 355;); the 16 most popular motivational 
traits, when factor analyzed, fall into a circular array 
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of opposing constructs, such as hostility/nurturance and 
dominance/submission (Smith, 1984; Wiggins, 1979; Wiggins 
& Broughton, 1985) . Furthermore, variation between 
dialectically opposed aims is for many, including many 
clinically-minded psychologists, related to ideas of 
incoherence, contradiction, splitting, and identity 
diffusion. The important point for the present discussion 
is that self-attributed personality abilities do not share 
self-attributed motives' grounding in an organizational 
rubric of opposition. Hence, they may reflect the 
implicit system more accurately. In fact, factor-analyzed 
personality abilities yield a positive manifold structure 
rather than a circumplex (Broughton & Paulhus, 1984): 
personality abilities which stand in conceptual opposition 
to one another show no negative correlations with one 
another. It seems, then, that personality abilities are 
again more closely aligned with implicit motives than are 
self-attributed motives. 
Summary 
The present study aims to garner support for 
theoretical, as opposed to methodological, explanations 
for operant and respondent motive measures' lack of 
relationship. One way to do this is to show that certain 
conceptually-relevant variables mediate obtained operant-
respondent relationships. First, mediational roles would 
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be implicated if "self-consciousness variables," such as 
inner-directedness or other-directedness, were found to 
affect operant-respondent correspondence for certain 
people. Inner-directedness, a dispositional tendency 
toward focusing attention on one's inner world, should be 
related to increased intermotive correspondence; other-
directedness, which involves an attentional focus on 
social demands and behavioral guidelines, should be 
related to decreased intermotive correspondence. 
Mediational roles would also be suggested if 
"go-between constructs," such as personal strivings and 
personality abilities, were shown to relate to implicit 
and self-attributed constructs that are unrelated to each 
other. In particular, personality abilities, or 
inhibition-free, verbal representations of organismic 
realities, should relate more strongly to implicit motives 
than do self-attributed motives. Personal strivings, or 
focused, verbal-conceptual instantiations of broad 
implicit dimensions, should relate to both implicit and 
self-attributed motives. 
The above propositions represent the conceptual 
groundwork that underlies the present work's 
investigative hypotheses. Each posits a relationship 
between various constructs based upon structural 
considerations. However, the interrelation of motives and 
motive-like constructs depends as much upon content as 
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upon structure. Structural considerations aside, we would 
not expect, for example, n Intimacy to relate 
substantially to san Achievement, while we might expect n 
power to relate to san Dominance. Before hypotheses can 
be formally stated, then, issues of motivational content 
must be addressed. It is with such matters that the next 
chapter is concerned. 
CHAPTER IV 
AGENCY AND COMMUNION 
The present work is primarily concerned with the 
structural aspects of motivation--with the organization of 
motives into a bi-level system. This focal examination of 
social motives' structural attributes, however, occurs 
against an organizing backdrop of thematic contents. As a 
prelude to the introduction of featured motives and 
their measures, which occurs later in the present chapter, 
and to the formal statement of hypotheses, which occurs in 
the next chapter, this background will now be brought to 
center stage. 
Theoretical Background 
Virtually all of the specific motives and motive-like 
constructs employed in the present study reflect one of 
two broad thematic categories. These categories have been 
identified by Bakan (1966) as agency and communion. He 
writes: 
Agency manifests itself in the formation of 
separations, isolation, alienation, aloneness, the 
urge to master, and the repression of thought, 
feeling, and impulse; communion is manifested in a 
sense of being at one with other organisms, a lack of 
separations, the lack and removal of repression, 
contact, openness, and union, and noncontractual 
cooperation (Bakan, 1966, p. 15) 
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Agency and communion are two fundamental adaptational 
modalities that apply to all living things. Agency 
encompasses basic instincts toward the protection, 
assertion, and expansion of the self. Communion, on the 
other hand, is reflected in collective phenomena--
phenomena of inclusion, participation and interdependence. 
As noted by McAdams (1988a), agency and communion are 
particularly pertinent to the classification of human 
social motives. Agentic motives involve the individual's 
mastery of other, and to a lesser degree of self, from 
from a vantage of separateness. Communal motives, on the 
other hand, pull for empathic merger with social and 
perhaps intrapsychic contexts. 
The concepts of agency and communion are not new. 
Instead, they represent timeless, archetypal clusterings 
of ideas that continually resurface in the theorizing of 
dualistically-inclined philosophers and psychological 
theorists (McAdams, 1988a). For example, Empedocles, a 
presocratic philosopher, identified strife, or separation, 
and love, or union, as the root principles inherent in all 
movement and change (McAdams, 1988b; Russell, 1945). Not 
only did love and strife account for the phenomena of 
physics; they also accounted for the dynamics of human 
relationships and even history. Many centuries later, 
Freud reduced the gamut of human motivation to the 
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workings of two primal ends--eros and thanatos. Eros, 
like communion, aims to "combine more and more living 
substance into even greater quantities," (Freud, 1933, p. 
140). On the other hand, thanatos, or agency, encompasses 
both aggression and the repetition of traumas for the sake 
of mastery and control, with an ultimate aim of 
reachieving an inorganic state. Agency and communion are 
similarly reflected in Rank's (1936) life fear/death fear 
duality. For Rank, there is an innate terror inherent in 
emerging from symbiosis to face one's individuality; 
like communion, this life fear promotes social embededness 
and attachment. Furthermore, it is offset by an opposing 
fear of losing whatever individuality one has won, or 
death fear. Like agency, Rank's death fear fosters both 
self-protective strivings and a related distancing from 
the interpersonal and intrapsychic contexts. As noted by 
McAdams (1988a), agency and communion are also inherent 
in a number of more recently proposed theoretical 
dualisms. These include, for example, masculine and 
feminine sex-role orientations (Bem, 1974), interpersonal 
distancing positions of individuation-deindividuation and 
attachment-detachment (Kaplan, 1988), and developmental 
psychologies of independence and inclusion (Kegan, 1982), 
or individuation and interdependence (Gilligan, 1982). 
Both agency and communion, as they apply to social 
motives, are captured by a few central, defining facets. 
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Agency's three components are separation, mastery, and 
domination. The separation component involves the 
individual's disengagement from interpersonal contexts, 
contexts which for others would comprise a rich life 
field. Agentic separation is exhibited, for example, in 
strivings toward autonomy and in the person's active 
dissociation from the opinions and values of others or of 
society at large. Agentic separation is further evident 
in a willful foregoing of strong interpersonal attachments 
or investments. In summary, motives toward separation 
foster the objectification of inner and outer reality: 
agentic separation informs the vital developmental process 
of "casting-out" or "throwing away from" that replaces 
contextual embeddedness with the possibility of 
relationships between a self and distinct social and 
phenomenological objects (Kegan, 1982). 
While agency's separation facet fosters a distancing 
from context, the mastery and domination facets concern 
the individual's attitude toward context. More 
specifically, mastery involves an attitude toward the 
objectified self while domination represents an attitude 
toward objectified others. Regarding the former, agentic 
mastery is embodied by the heroic ego (Hillman, 1979), 
which separates itself from the chaos of id and 
establishes a reality-based dominion over it. In fact, a 
major criticism of Freud is that he ignored the ego's own 
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mastery-based motives, framing it as a victim of 
contradictory forces rather than a goal-seeking force in 
its own right (Patterson, 1986). The ego, as a conceptual 
embodiment of agentic mastery, finds both (1) limiting the 
self, as with repression, suppression, sphincter control, 
activity regimens, abstinence, and inhibition, and (2) 
pushing the self to its physical, intellectual, spiritual, 
and ethical limits to be inherently satisfying. Agentic 
mastery, then, involves both pushing personal limits, as 
in excelling, and limiting personal "push," as in self-
control. Mastery is expressed phenomenologically in 
experiences of ambition, determination and effort. 
Agentic domination, which represents an other-
directed mirror image of self-mastery, involves the 
submission of the interpersonal world to personal ends. 
Agentic domination renders other people as both vehicles 
for the individual's continuing self-aggrandizement and 
subjects to it. The former is evidenced in activities as 
diverse as persuading, competing, helping, exciting, 
exploiting, teaching, degrading, and inspiring; the latter 
is evident in concerns with prestige and impression 
management, as well as investment in high-visibility 
activities such as acting, public speaking, and politics. 
All of these examples involve a tacit, temporary 
transformation of relationships between equals into 
relationships between superiors and inferiors (e.g., 
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winner-loser, helper-helpee, film star-fan); agentic 
individuals gain particular pleasure from being in the 
superior, "one-up" social position and also from having an 
impact on others. While dominative motives typically 
receive a negative cast in contemporary American society, 
it is noteworthy that they can serve both benevolent-
prosocial, as in teaching and leading, as well as 
malevolent-antisocial ends. 
Like agency, communion is reflected in three central 
facets: unity, intimacy, and nurturance. The first of 
these facets is manifest in "the participation of the 
individual in some larger organism of which the individual 
is a part" (Bakan, 1966, p. 15). Unity is an orientation 
toward contact and connection with one's social group, 
reflecting an ethic of interdependence rather than 
independence. The unity-oriented person tends toward 
sociability, cooperativeness, and gregariousness, as 
benevolent relations with the social group become the very 
fabric of personal identity. Rather than the ego, then, 
it is the social group that provides organization, 
direction, and self-esteem. Unity also pulls for an 
unquestioning adoption of group concerns, beliefs, values, 
and conventions. In a sense, unity represents a 
voluntary, pleasurable relinquishing of individuality: 
self-other distinctions become blurred, as "I-ness" is 
subsumed by "We-ness." 
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Communion's second facet, intimacy, is concerned with 
select others rather than the social group as a whole. 
Intimacy, in short, represents a drive toward sharing 
oneself and experiencing someone else in the deepest 
possible sense. Deriving from the Latin term for "inner" 
or "inmost" (Perlman & Fehr, 1987), intimacy most 
centrally reflects a sharing with another of that which is 
inmost (McAdams, 1988a). McAdams (1988a) writes: 
In communion, the vulnerable self risks even greater 
vulnerability by surrendering control in 
interpersonal relations and offering the self up as a 
kind of gift, awaiting the reciprocal gift-giving of 
the other. Bakan's communion mandates intimate self-
disclosure in the presence of a listener who receives 
the disclosure as a gift, cherishing it as a token of 
an ever-developing closeness. (p. 20) 
Intimacy hence represents an attraction to a special type 
of dyadic interpersonal relationship characterized by 
openness, receptivity, and reciprocity--by a non-
contractual giving of oneself and receiving of other. 
Also encompassed by the intimacy facet are 1) a real 
concern for the other's well-being and 2) a surrender of 
any form of control over the parameters of the 
relationship (McAdams, 1988b). In summary, intimacy is 
epitomized by "being in an encounter which is perceived as 
an end in itself rather than (by) doing or striving to 
attain either a relationship or some extrinsic reward 
(McAdams, 1988b, p. 76). Although it is underemphasized 
in the literature, the intimacy facet also has a self-
reflexive aspect, as manifest in openness to experience 
(McCrae & Costa, 1985), regression in the service of the 
ego (Holt, 1970), abaissement di niveau mental (Jung, 
1968), and absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). In 
fact, measures of socially-defined communion correlate 
positively with a self-report measure of openness to 
experience (Hoffman, 1989). 
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Communion's final facet, nurturance, is exclusively 
concerned with the giving and receiving of help, where 
help is broadly defined to include emotional, material, 
physical, developmental, and social forms of aid. In 
Murray's (1938) terms, nurturance, as defined presently, 
encompasses needs for both nurturance and succorance. The 
former is expressed in sympathetic attempts at gratifying 
the needs of a helpless other: "an infant or any O (other) 
that is weak, disabled, tired, inexperienced, infirm, 
defeated, humiliated, lonely, defected, sick, mentally 
confused" (Murray, 1938, p. 184). Hence, nurturance 
involves the response to an empathic perception of 
another's need, rather than indiscriminate helping. 
Murray's succorance, on the other hand, involves wishes to 
"have one's needs gratified by the sympathetic aid of an 
allied O;" "to always have a supporter" (p. 182). From a 
truly communal perspective, the distinction between giving 
and receiving help is actually irrelevant, as communion is 
predicated on a sort of blurring of boundaries between 
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self and other, mine and yours. 
It should be clear at this point that agency and 
communion stand in conceptual opposition to one another. 
However, as recognized by Bakan (1966), Jung (1971), Bern 
(1981), Kaplan (1988), and others, the two dimensions 
represent independent human potentials rather than poles 
of a single thematic dimension. Actually, levels of 
agency and communion interact so as to either mitigate and 
transform each other's effects or facilitate one or the 
other's pure expression. Agency mitigated by communion, 
for example, loses its malevolent, destructive qualities 
(Bakan, 1966). On the other hand, unmitigated communion 
is related to a dependent personality style, and 
unmitigated agency is r'eflected in an aggressive 
personality style (Hoffman, 1989). A lack of both agency 
and communion, finally, is related to the schizoid 
personality style, with its acquisitive and interpersonal 
apathies. Agency and communion, then, are separate 
dimensions whose interactions account for different 
personological patterns. Actually, some recent factor 
analytic research suggests that agency's empirical 
opposite is concerned with anxiety and a lack of 
confidence rather than with communion. Communion's 
opposite, furthermore, seems to be an apathetic, 
unresponsive cold-heartedness (Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990). 
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agentic Constructs and Measures 
TAT Power Motivation. Winter (1973) has developed a 
TAT measure of n Power, which is a "recurrent preference 
or readiness for experiences of having impact and feeling 
strong ... vis-a-vis the environment" (McAdams, 1988b, p. 
84). As a facet of implicit agency, power motivation 
captures the aforementioned domination facet. Winter and 
Stewart (1978), for example, write, ''the essence of power 
is the ability to make the material world and the social 
world conform to one's own image or plan for it" (p. 400). 
Indeed, a drive toward domination is reflected in each of 
n Power's four defining themes: conquest, exploitative 
relationships, organization, and prestige. Conquest 
represents the urge to dominate in its most primitive, 
unveneered form--in the urge to overpower through patently 
aggressive acts. Males high in n Power, for example, 
participate in directly competitive sports significantly 
more often than others and also engage in more frequent 
aggressive acts, such as insulting store clerks and 
yelling in traffic (Boyatzis, 1973; Winter, 1973). 
Similarly, n Power is positively correlated with frequency 
of reported arguments in working-class males (McClelland, 
1975). Power motivation's second defining theme, 
exploitative relationships, involves the use of 
friendships and romantic relationships as vehicles for 
further domination. In the realm of friendship, men and 
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women high in n Power tend to adopt an active, assertive, 
controlling role and to prefer large groups to more 
intimate dyads (McAdams, Healy, & Krause, 1986}. In men, 
n Power also correlates positively with number of sexual 
partners (Winter, 1973} and with disclosure of details of 
sex life (McClelland, 1975). More generally, high-n Power 
men, like the literary character, Don Juan, have an eat-
them-up-and-spit-them-out orientation toward love 
relationships, as evidenced in a tendency to move from one 
serious relationship to another in rapid succession. 
Organization and prestige, n Power's third and fourth 
defining themes, represent more sublimated expressions of 
agentic domination. In the case of the former, social 
domination is sought through the occupation of socially-
sanctioned power positions. For example, n Power 
correlates positively with occupation of leadership 
positions in various organizations by both college 
students (Winter, 1973} and working-class adults 
(McClelland, Wanner, & Vanneman, 1972}, and with 
preferences for careers that involve the direction of 
others' behaviors (Winter & Stewart, 1978). Fodor and 
Smith (1982}, furthermore, found high Il Power individuals 
to foster an authoritarian, discussion-inhibiting 
atmosphere when appointed leader of a problem-solving 
group. Power motivation also leads to attempts at social 
domination via alliance with consensually-defined signs of 
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power. Along these lines, n Power is related to both the 
furnishing of personal dorm rooms with prestige 
possessions, such as televisions, framed posters, and tape 
players, and number of credit cards carried on one's 
person (Boyatzis, 1973; Winter, 1973). 
TAT Achievement Motivation. N Achievement, which is 
the most extensively researched of the TAT social motives, 
is defined as "a concern with doing things better, with 
surpassing standards of excellence" (McClelland et al., 
1953, p. 228). This implicit disposition, then, involves 
a rendering of the self as a vehicle for agentic assertion 
and expansion, such that power or potency is experienced 
through personal accomplishment rather than through social 
domination; n Achievement is differentiated from n Power, 
then, in that the former concerns personal performance 
while the latter concerns social impact (Veroff, 1982). 
From another perspective, n Achievement can be seen as a 
more socialized derivative of n Power, where the 
individual seeks to dominate symbolically, by surpassing 
internalized societal standards in a benevolent, prosocial 
manner, rather than literally, by overwhelming others in 
an adversarial manner. The excitement of power-related 
activity is replaced by the satisfaction of a job well 
done. Taken in tandem, these considerations suggest n.._ 
Achievement to be a relatively pure marker for agency's 
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mastery facet. 
A substantial body of research supports n 
Achievement's contentual grounding in agentic mastery. In 
particular, n Achievement has been repeatedly linked to a 
gravitation toward, striving at, and success in academic 
and business endeavors. In particular, achievement-
oriented college students adopt a performance-oriented 
stance toward their schoolwork, such that grades take-on 
special significance. Andrews (1966), for example, found 
positive correlations between n Achievement and both (1) 
investigating course requirements prior to registration, 
and (2) discussing exams with instructors before and after 
exam administration. N Achievement assessed during the 
college years also predicts involvement in the business 
world 14 years later (McClelland, 1965). In fact, n 
Achievement has repeatedly been found to predict 
involvement and success with entrepreneurial activity, 
which places a premium on personal performance, control, 
and responsibility (Koestner & McClelland, 1990). As an 
example, Indian farmers (i.e., agricultural entrepreneurs) 
high in n Achievement are more likely than others to both 
experiment with innovative farming approaches (Sinha & 
Mehta, 1972) and to show enhanced productivity over time 
(Singh, 1979). 
Several studies have also examined n Achievement's 
relation to "doing better" in social and even physical 
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domains. High-achievement children receive higher ratings 
than others on social cooperativeness and general 
likeability (Feld, 1967; Lifshitz, 1974; Teevan, 
Diffenderfer, & Greenfeld, 1986). In adults, n 
Achievement is related to marital adjustment (McAdams & 
vaillant, 1982; Veroff & Feld 1970) and peers' perceptions 
of the individual as successful in life, as well as work 
(Kaltenback & McClelland, 1958). Finally, n Achievement 
is related to higher self-ratings of personal health 
(Veroff, 1982); it also predicts cardiac health, 30 years 
subsequent to motive assessment (McClelland, 1979). 
Various mediators and mitigators have been identified 
in the relationship between n Achievement and performance. 
Furthermore, each of these factors supports n 
Achievement's linking with a specific behavioral, as 
opposed to task, incentive, thus supporting 
Il Achievement's structural grounding in the implicit 
motivational system. As already alluded, the presumed 
behavioral incentive for n Achievement is an innately 
pleasurable sense of "doing better." This presumption is 
supported by numerous studies linking n Achievement to a 
preference fDr activities of moderate challenge (Atkinson, 
1958; Clark & McClelland, 1956; Karabenick and Youseff, 
1968; McClelland et al., 1989; Raynor & Entin, 1982). 
Apparently, moderately challenging activities maximize the 
probability of experiencing the emotional-behavioral 
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incentive, as neither too-easy nor too-difficult tasks 
afford a sense of having accomplished something or 
improved performance (Koestner & McClelland, 1990). Other 
studies have identified self-determination and 
performance feedback as further preconditions for the 
expression of n Achievement in behavior. Extrinsic 
incentives and controls, such as money (Atkinson, 1958; 
oouvan, 1956) or promptings to hurry (Schroth, 1988), 
eliminate n Achievement's performance-enhancing effects. 
This makes sense theoretically, in that social pressures 
(1) tacitly reframe the task in an incentive-irrelevant 
manner, and (2) de-emphasize personal responsibility for 
outcome (Koestner & McClelland, 1990). Performance 
feedback on the other hand, has been shown to enhance n 
Achievement's behavior-predicting power (Bartmann, 1965; 
French, 1958). Again this finding is consistent with 
theory, as knowing whether or not one has "done better" is 
essential to the postulated behavioral incentive for 
achievement behavior. 
Autobiographical Agency. Unlike TAT measures of 
n Achievement and n Power, which only capture a given 
facet of agency, McAdams' (1990) story-based 
autobiographical agency measure taps all relevant facets 
of agency, or n Agency. In fact, the measure was 
explicitly designed with Bakan's (1966) formulations in 
mind. Like TAT measures, the autobiographical agency 
94 
measure relies on the thematic coding of subject-produced 
stories. In this case, however, the stories represent 
accounts of nuclear episodes from the test-taker's life 
narrative, rather than stories told to vague pictures of 
interpersonal events. Although McAdams' formal system 
calls for the scoring of ten nuclear episodes, the present 
study examines only two of these--the earliest memory and 
the peak experience. These two were chosen because of 
their conceptual fit with the previously-advanced notions 
of implicit motives. Peak experiences are defined in 
McAdams' (1990) Guided Autobiography packet as a moments 
or episodes in the individual's life "in which he or she 
feels a sense of transcendence, uplifting, inner joy or 
peace, excitement, or some other highly positive emotional 
experience." As such, the peak experience seems an 
especially apt medium for implicit motive assessment, as 
implicit motives are purportedly built upon, and organized 
around, pleasurable affective experiences (McClelland et 
al., 1989). Early memories, on the other hand, are 
thought to represent symbolic expressions of foundational 
object relations paradigms. Mayman (1968), for example, 
comments that 
early memories are expressions of important fantasies 
around which a person's character-structure is 
organized ..•. the themes which bind together the 
dramatis personae of a person's early memories define 
nuclear relationship-patterns (i.e., patterns of 
social motivation) which are likely to repeat 
themselves in a wide range of other life 
situations (p. 304) 
similarly, Saul et al. (1956) note that early memories 
"reveal, probably more clearly than any other single 
psychological datum, the central core of each person's 
psychodynamics (and) chief motivations" (p. 235). In 
conclusion, there is good reason to expect both peak 
experiences and early memories to be appropriate vessels 
for implicit motivational themes. 
95 
At present, McAdams' autobiographical coding system 
remains an experimental measure; relevant empirical 
validity data on autobiographical agency scores' 
suitability as operationalizations of n Agency does not 
yet exist. The coding system does, however, boast a high 
degree of face validity. Specifically, peak experiences 
and early memories are scored for the presence or absence 
of four agentic themes: strength/impact, 
status/recognition, competence/accomplishment, and 
autonomy/independence. The strength/impact category 
reflects particular aspects of both agentic domination 
(i.e., trying to have an impact on others) and agentic 
mastery (i.e., trying to expand the self's strength in 
physical, mental, moral and/or emotional domains). 
Status/recognition and competence/accomplishment, 
furthermore, capture those aspects of agentic domination 
and mastery not covered by strength/impact. status/ 
recognition involves attempts to "attain a high level of 
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social standing vis-a-vis others" (McAdams, 1990. p. 5), 
while competence/accomplishment addresses attempts at 
pushing one's personal limits, or excelling. Lastly, 
McAdams' autonomy/independence category is a clear, 
straightforward operationalization of agency's separation 
facet. 
Bern Sex Role Inventory Masculinity Scale. In a 
comprehensive review of numerous popular self-report 
scales, Wiggins and Broughton (1985) identified the Bern 
sex Role Inventory's (BSRI's) Masculinity scale as the 
best measure of "ambitious-dominant traits" (p. 39), or in 
our terms, san Agency. Furthermore, analysis of the 
scale's 20 self-descriptive adjectives suggests a 
comprehensive and relatively even covering of agency's 
three defining facets. Seven of the items deal with 
agentic separation (sample items: "independent;" "self-
sufficient,") while another seven reflect agentic 
domination (sample items: "act as a Leader;" "forceful"). 
The remaining five scale items address assorted aspects of 
agency's mastery facet (sample items: "ambitious," 
"athletic") . 
Studies relevant to the BSRI Masculinity scale's 
validity are restricted to examinations of maeculine sex-
typed subjects, or subjects who score both high on BSRI 
Masculinity and low on the BSRI's Femininity scale. Bern's 
(1981) definition of masculine sex-typing bears striking 
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resemblance to McClelland et al.'s {1989) more general 
formulations of self-attributed motives. Specifically, 
the masculine sex-typed individual is someone 
motivated to keep her or his behavior consistent with 
an idealized image of ... masculinity, a goal that she 
or he presumably accomplishes both by selecting 
behaviors and attributes that enhance the image and 
by avoiding behaviors and attributes that violate the 
image. (Bern, 1981, p. 4). 
The present paper's exclusive consideration of masculine 
sex-typed subjects, rather than of all subjects scoring 
high on BSRI masculinity, follows from Bern's (1981) 
warning that androgenous individuals (i.e., people who 
score high on both BSRI masculinity and femininity) are 
not necessarily high on san Agency; instead, they are 
usually people for whom sex-role distinctions are not 
salient. Androgenous people, in other words, do not 
construe themselves and their implicit impulses based on 
sex-role constructs. Instead, they exhibit a behavioral 
and situational flexibility (some have called this 
inconsistency) that belies a lack of investment in being 
consistently masculine or feminine. 
Research on BSRI Masculinity, or more accurately, 
masculine sex-typing, supports both the construct's 
structural basis in the self-attributed system and its 
contentual basis in agency. Several studies have examined 
masculine sex-typing's effect on the processing of verbal, 
self-conceptual information. Masculine sex-typing is 
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related both to enhanced recall of agentic self-
descriptive adjectives and to enhanced access to episodic 
memories supportive of agentic self-ascribed traits 
(Markus, Crane, Berntein, & Siladi, 1982; Mills, 1983). 
Masculine .sex-typing also affects processing speed for 
identity-consistent, or agentic, and identity-
inconsistent, or communal, descriptors: masculine sex-
typed. people take significantly less time to endorse 
agentic self-descriptive adjectives than to endorse 
communal self-descriptive adjectives; they also take less 
time to identify inapplicable communal adjectives as such 
than to identify inapplicable agentic adjectives (Markus 
et al., 1982). Following exposure to a masculine identity 
threat, masculine sex-typed individuals rate themselves as 
significantly more masculine than do masculine sex-typed 
controls or androgenous subjects (Babl, 1979). Taken 
together, the above findings suggest BSRI-assessed 
masculine sex-typing to tap an investment in both (1) 
maintaining and presenting an agentic self-image, and (2) 
avoiding or denying potential communal attributes 
inconsistent with this self-image. 
Numerous studies have also linked masculine sex-
typing to agentic behavior (Bern, 1981). Bern (1975), for 
example, found masculine sex-typed individuals to display 
an agentic separation from the opinions of peers. 
Specifically, masculine sex-typed subjects' ratings of 
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cartoons' funniness were relatively unaffected by (bogus) 
information as to others' ratings. As another example,_ 
Bem and Lenney (1976) had subjects choose 30 behaviors 
from a list of 60 agentic, communal, and neutral options, 
informing them that they would subsequently be 
photographed engaging in these 30 activities. Masculine 
sex-typed subjects evidenced significantly more avoidance 
of communal behavioral options than did others. Masculine 
sex-typed individuals also display significantly more 
aggression than do others, where "aggression" is 
operationalized as the average magnitude of shocks 
administered to a bogus opponent in a competitive shock 
paradigm (Hoppe, 1979). Kaplan and Sedney (1980) have 
criticized studies like those above for their 
artificiality, noting that BSRI validational studies are 
typically conducted in "high self-conscious" situations. 
From the present perspective, however, BSRI masculine sex-
typing's apparent predictive restriction to agentic 
behaviors in self-conscious situations enhances the 
instrument's validity as a measure of san Agency. 
A maximal rephrasing of the BSRI masculinity scale 
will be used to assess agentic personal abilities, or 
£ Agency. Specifically, each agentic adjective from the 
BSRI scale will be embedded in the stem, "How are 
you capable of being?" As with the standard BSRI, 
subjects will rate each of these stems on a seven-point 
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Likert scale (1 = Not at all capable; 7 = Extremely 
capable). This is a purely experimental measure for wnich 
no prior validational research exists. It does, however, 
share the BSRI Masculinity scale's face validity as a 
measure of agency. 
Agentic Adjective Checklist (ACL) scales. A second 
measure of san Agency to be employed in the present study 
is actually a composite measure of the ACL's Achievement 
and Dominance scales. These scales were chosen for two 
reasons. First, the two scales, taken in tandem, cover 
the ambitious-dominant factor's, or agency's, full breadth 
(Wiggins & Broughton (1985). Second, they share a common 
heritage with TAT and autobiographical motive measures--
both are based in Murray's (1938) need formulations. The 
ACL Achievement scale is expressly concerned with agency's 
mastery facet, assessing a self-attributed need "to strive 
to be outstanding in pursuits of socially recognized 
significance" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 8). Gough and 
Heilbrun (1983) expand on this definition thusly: 
The high-scorer on Ach is a hard-working, goal-
directed individual, who is determined to do well and 
usually does. The motivation to succeed seems to lie 
less in competitive drives than in an insistent need 
to live up to high and socially commendable criteria 
of performance. (p. 8) 
The ACL's Dominance scale, on the other hand, captures a 
self-attributed need "to seek and maintain a role as 
leader in groups, or to be influential and controlling in 
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individual relationships" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 8), 
or agentic domination. Adjectival descriptors with a high 
positive loading on ACL Dominance include aggressive, 
dominant, assertive, forceful, and stubborn. Actually, 
one third of ACL Dominance's items concern agentic 
separation, rather than dominance. In fact, these items 
are also included on the ACL's Autonomy scale. ACL 
Dominance, then, concerns a self-reported need to "act 
independently of others or of social values and 
expectations" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 12) as well as a 
need to dominate. This truism is reflected in Gough and 
Heilbrun's description of the high-scorer on ACL Dominance 
as someone who is "little ... inhibited by the disapproval 
or opposition of others" (p. 9). 
Validity data for the ACL scales comes from two 
sources: peer ratings and correlations with similar 
constructs from other psychological instruments. As 
regards the former, ACL Dominance is positively correlated 
with observers ratings of masculinity (i.e., robust, self-
sufficient, and strong) and dominance (Gough & Heilbrun, 
1983). For women, ACL Achievement is also positively 
related to dominance ratings. In a correlational analysis 
of the ACL and Gough's (1987) California Psychological 
Inventory (CPI), Gough and Heilbrun (1983) found both ACL 
Achievement and ACL Dominance to correlate positively and 
significantly with the CPI's Intellectual Efficiency 
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(i.e., persistent, self-motivated, and economical) and 
Dominance scales. Additionally, ACL Achievement related 
to CPI Achievement via Conformance, while ACL Dominance 
was related to CPI Capacity for Status (i.e., ambitious, 
independent) and Social Presence (i.e., self-assured, 
forthright). In addition to supporting ACL Dominance's 
and ACL Achievement's, validities, the above nomological 
net also suggests a good deal of Dominance-Achievement 
overlap. Hence, the general validity of the superordinate 
agency construct is supported as well. 
Agentic strivings. Emmons' (1988) manual for the 
thematic coding of personal strivings includes three 
striving categories concerned with agency--g Self-
Sufficiency/Independence, g Power, and g Achievement. In 
fact, each of these dimensions represents a relatively 
pure measure of one of agency's three facets. ~ Self-
Sufficieny/Independence is concerned with agentic 
separation. Scoring criteria include "Concern with being 
an individual, separated, autonomous from others," and 
"Concern with seeking, establishing, or maintaining 
independence" (Emmons, 1988, p. 25). Examples of 
category-relevant strivings include "Be myself and not do 
things to please others," "Be different," and "Keep my 
thoughts independent of others" (Emmons, 1990, pp. 25-26). 
~ Power, on the other hand, captures agentic domination, 
encompassing strivings for social impact, social control, 
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status, notoriety, winning in competition with others, and 
indiscriminant helping. Typical instantiations of § Power 
are "Be the dominant sibling in a family of six," 
"Impress people," "Act as therapist to friends," 
"Entertain others," and "Show that I'm superior to others" 
(Emmons, 1988, p. 16). While § Power involves dominating 
others via competition, § Achievement is more concerned 
with agentic mastery, or competing with self-imposed 
standards. Scoring criteria for § Achievement involve 
meeting goals, excelling, or expending effort; sample 
strivings include "Set high goals for myself and try to 
reach them," and "Put my best effort into everything I do" 
(Emmons, 1988, p. 5). 
Although some validational research has been 
conducted on various striving variables (for a review, see 
Emmons, 1989), Emmons and McAdams' (1989) aforementioned 
study is the only one to examine individual agentic 
strivings. While the results have already been presented 
as supportive of strivings' structural attributes, these 
same results also corroborate the just-discussed content 
validity data, at least for § Power and § Achievement. 
Specifically, both striving categories were found to 
correlate positively and significantly with more well-
validated markers of their agentic facet domains: § 
Achievement correlated with TAT-assessed n Achievement and 
PRF-assessed san Achievement, while § Power was related to 
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TAT-assessed n Power and PRF Dominance. 
communal Constructs and Measures 
TAT Intimacy Motivation. McAdams (1979) has 
developed a TAT motive measure of n Intimacy that is 
explicitly derived from Bakan's (1966) reflections on 
communion. N Intimacy is defined as "a recurrent 
preference or readiness for experiences of warm, close, 
and communicative exchange" (McAdams, 1988b, p. 77). As 
such, it represents an orientation to dyadic interpersonal 
relationships characterized by reciprocal self disclosure: 
one's innermost self is surrendered or offered to another, 
and reciprocally, the other is warmly received through 
careful listening. 
Validational research both expands on n Intimacy's 
nature and further illustrates its grounding in 
communion's intimacy facet. Employing a beeper 
methodology, McAdams and Constantian (1983) found college 
students high in n Intimacy to spend significantly more 
time involved in conversation and letter-writing than 
others. Furthermore, n Intimacy correlated positively and 
substantially with percentage of random beepings during 
which students where concerned with interpersonally-
oriented thoughts; it also correlated negatively with 
percentage of interacting episodes in which students 
wished to be alone or not interacting. McAdams and Powers 
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(1981) have also linked n Intimacy to a thematic 
clustering in thought and action. High-intimacy 
individuals engage in significantly more discrete 
behaviors indicative of merger, such as physical proximity 
behavior and "we" references. They also emphasize 
communal themes--themes of reciprocal dialogue, surrender 
of control, and positive affect, when asked to structure 
their own psychodramas. Finally, high-intimacy 
individuals tend toward a communal presentation of self, 
as reflected in positive correlations with peer ratings on 
communal adjectives (i.e., sincere, loving, and likable). 
In two distinct studies, then, n Intimacy has been linked 
to a communal ordering in both spontaneous thought and 
operant behavior. 
A number of additional studies attest to 
n Intimacy's validity and breadth as a facet measure of 
communion. Coding videotaped, open-ended interviews, 
McAdams, Jackson, and Kirshnit (1984) found high-intimacy 
individuals to engage in eye contact, smiling, and 
laughing--all nonverbal behaviors aimed at maintaining or 
bolstering contact and warmth. These same persons' 
interview accounts of friendship episodes also evidenced a 
comparative emphasis on self disclosure and adopting the 
listener role with friends. Additionally, n intimacy has 
been shown to relate to information processing: high-
intimacy individuals are selectively attentive to 
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communion-related facial cues (McAdams, 1979) and 
selectively recall episodic memories tinged with commun~l 
interpersonal themes (McAdams, 1982b). Finally, McAdams 
and Vaillant (1982) found n Intimacy to predict adult 
males' marital satisfaction 17 years after motive 
assessment. 
Autobiographical Communion. McAdams' (1990) 
autobiographical coding system, as previously discussed in 
the context of agency (seep. 93), also includes a highly 
face valid, four-category thematic coding system for 
communion. In this case, the categories are 
unity/togetherness, love/friendship, dialogue/sharing, and 
care/support. As in the case of McAdams' four agentic 
categories, these four communal dimensions address the 
full range of implicit communal social motives, or 
n Communion, in a comprehensive way. The unity/ 
togetherness category encompasses allusions to the 
blurring of boundaries between self and social context, 
and as such, marks communion's unity facet. The 
love/friendship and dialogue/sharing categories 
respectively involve the experience of "positive affect as 
the result of an interpersonal relationship" (McAdams, 
1990, p. 11) and an actor's engagement in reciprocal, 
noninstrumental social interaction. In tandem, then, the 
two categories cover communion's intimacy facet. 
Care/support, the autobiographical communion system's 
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final thematic category, reflects communion's nurturance 
facet, involving either the giving or receiving of help,_ 
support, or comfort. 
Bern Sex Role Inventory Femininity Scale. After 
factor analytically reviewing several of personality 
psychology's most popular self-report trait scales, 
Wiggins and Broughton (1985) judged the BSRI Femininity 
scale to be the "best'' (i.e., contentually most accurate) 
measure of "warm-agreeable interpersonal traits" (p. 39), 
or communion. The scale's thematic fit with communion can 
be further fine-tuned via observance of Pedhazur and 
Tetenenbaum's (1979) factor analytically informed 
recommendations. Specifically, they advocate the 
elimination of six communion-inconsistent items from the 
Femininity scale and the addition of five communion-
consistent items from the BSRI's 20 neutral, "filler" 
items. The resultant 19-item, revised BSRI Femininity 
Scale is both thematically and empirically more homogenous 
(Costos, 1986). In fact, content analysis of the scale 
suggests a broad covering of communion's various facets. 
The intimacy facet is represented by adjectives that 
either address the behavioral-affective concomitants of 
closeness (e.g., "warm;" "affectionate") or imply a 
concern with relational honesty and empathy (e.g., 
"sincere;" "understanding"). Other items address the 
friendly, prosocial orientation that accompanies communal 
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union (e.g., "cheerful," "friendly") and the caring, 
supportive stance of communal nurturance (e.g., "eager to 
soothe hurt feelings;" sympathetic"). 
The distinction between sex-roles and androgyny 
advanced in the context of BSRI Masculinity applies to 
BSRI Femininity as well. Hence, the evidence supporting 
BSRI Femininity's validity as a measure of san Communion 
will be restricted to data on feminine sex-typed 
individuals. Some of this data links feminine sex-typing 
with self-schematic processes. Feminine sex-typed people 
exhibit enhanced recall for both recently-presented 
communal self-descriptors and episodic memories that 
support their espoused communal identities (Markus et al., 
1982). Additionally, feminine sex-typing increases the 
speed with which individuals can identify identity-
consistent descriptors as such and also deny identity-
inconsistent descriptors. Feminine sex-typed individuals 
endorse identity-consistent communal descriptors faster 
than noncommunal identity-consistent adjectives; they also 
deny identity-inconsistent agentic descriptors more 
quickly than other identity-inconsistent descriptors 
(Markus et al., 1982; Mills, 1983). Feminine sex-typing, 
then, seems related to a schematic "pocket of certainty" 
concerning an espoused communal persona and denied agentic 
attributes. 
Feminine sex-typing also has a number of correlates 
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in the domain of communal choice behavior. When given a 
choice between various activities, for example, feminine 
sex-typed individuals spend more time engaged in a 
nurturant activity (i.e., interacting with a kitten) and 
also enjoy the nurturant activity more than masculine sex-
typed people (Bern, 1975). Feminine sex-typing is also 
related to an avoidance of agentic activity options when 
individuals are presented with a variety of activities to 
choose from (Bern & Lenney, 1976). As a final example, 
feminine sex-typed individuals choose communal 
(traditional) career interests over agentic (non-
traditional) ones on a career preference questionnaire 
(Clarey & Sanford, 1982). 
As in the case of the BSRI Masculinity scale, a 
rephrased version of the revised BSRI Femininity scale 
will be employed to assess communal personal abilities, or 
~ Communion. Each of the scale's communal adjectives will 
be inserted into the stem, "How are you capable of 
being?,'' and subjects will rate each sentence's self-
relevance on a seven-point Likert scale. This 
experimental measure is unresearched. By virtue of its 
derivation from the BSRI Femininity scale, however, it 
does have appreciable content validity as a measure of 
communion. 
Communal Adjective Checklist (ACL) scales. A second 
measure of san Communion employed in the present study 
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involves the combination of the Murray need-derived ACL 
Nurturance and ACL Intraception scales into a composite 
measure. The choice of these two scales stems largely 
from Wiggins and Broughton's (1985) identification of both 
as zero-order correlates of the warm-agreeable, or 
communal, interpersonal trait dimension. ACL Nurturance 
is defined as a need "to engage in behaviors that provide 
material or emotional benefits to others" (Gough & 
Heilbrun, 1983). While the scale is expressly concerned 
only with communion's nurturance facet, however, it, upon 
closer examination, appears to involve union and intimacy 
facets.as well. Regarding the former, the high scorer on 
ACL Nurturance "appears to like people; to have a 
cooperative, unaffected, and tactful social manner" (Gough 
& Heilbrun, 1983, p. 10). Furthermore, the intimacy facet 
is suggested by descriptions of the high-nurturance 
individual as someone who both "moves toward people, 
rather than away from them (and) attempts to understand 
others" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1980, p. 10), and "has 
warmth .. .'(and) the capacity for close relationships" 
(Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 10). 
Where ACL Nurturance is at least predominantly 
concerned with the provision of material and emotional 
benefits to others, ACL Intraception is more concerned 
with communion's intimacy facet. Specifically, ACL 
Intraception concerns a self-attributed need "to 
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understand one's own behavior or the behavior of others" 
(Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 10); hence, Intraception 
concerns intimacy in both its interpersonal and 
intrapsychic manifestations. Analysis of actual scale 
content corroborates this conclusion: 50 percent of the 
items are concerned with a humane, communal interpersonal 
orientation (sample items: considerate, forgiving, 
sensitive, tolerant), while another 20 percent address an 
openness to experience (sample items: imaginative, 
reflective, insightful). The remaining scale items, which 
involve logicality and foresightedness, are unrelated to 
communion. 
Only limited validity data is available for the 
ACL's Intraception and Nurturance scales. At least in the 
case of women, ACL Nurturance correlates significantly and 
positively with observer's ratings on femininity; 
"femininity'' in this case was operationalized as a 
behavioral manner that is "receptive, responsive, and 
sympathetic" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983). Nurturance is also 
positively related to a few communal CPI constructs, such 
as Good Impression (i.e., an orientation toward pleasing 
others rather than asserting the self), Communality (i.e., 
focused on "fitting in" with the group and being 
"average"), Socialization (i.e., ready to conform 
comfortably to societal guidelines; men only) and 
Tolerance (i.e., tolerant of alternate beliefs and values; 
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women only). Like ACL Nurturance, ACL Intraception is 
also positively correlated with CPI Good Impression, 
communality (women only), Socialization (men only), and 
Tolerance. It is additionally related to CPI Sociability 
(i.e., friendliness) and Hogan's (1969) Empathy Scale 
(Gough & Heilbrun, 1983). 
Communal Strivings. Two striving categories from 
Emmons' (1988) coding system, § Intimacy and§ 
Interpersonal, connote aspects of communion. These will 
now be discussed sequentially. Five of the six scoring 
categories for § Intimacy are concerned with strivings 
toward empathic, euthymic, reciprocal, communicative 
relationships with select others. As such, they capture 
communion's intimacy facet. The sixth scoring category 
for§ Intimacy, which concerns loyalty and responsibility 
toward the social group, seems more reflective of 
communion's unity facet. Sample intimate strivings 
include "Stay close to Pam," "Be respectful to everyone," 
and "Try to be a good listener," (Emmons, 1988, pp 13-14). 
Furthermore, § Intimacy correlates positively and 
significantly with n Intimacy, a well-validated measure of 
communion's intimacy facet (Emmons & McAdams, 1989). To 
the degree that Emmons' long list of sample intimate 
strivings is a representative one, it appears that § 
Intimacy's single, unity-based scoring category accounts 
for a disproportionate amount of the actual intimate 
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strivings that people produce. Furthermore, items 
concerning nurturant helping also appear with some 
frequency. ~ Intimacy, then, may be best construed as a 
composite intimacy-unity-nurturance measure. 
The g Interpersonal category includes all strivings 
that concern others rather than the self. Unlike other 
striving categories, then, 2 Interpersonal addresses the 
object, or direction, of the striving rather than the 
striving's specific content. Contentually agentic 
strivings, such as "dominate in arguments with others," 
can still be scored in this (purportedly) communal 
category. The inclusion of this dimension in the present 
study is based on the theoretical assumption that the 
proportion of other-referent to self-referent strivings 
provides a rough index of communion's unity facet: to the 
extent that strivings reflect integrations of the self, as 
James (1890) and Rank (1936) would agree, then a high 
score on g Interpersonal suggests a self with a social, 
rather than personal locus. As already noted, this social 
locus of the self is the very crux of communion's union 
facet. Tentative support for 2 Interpersonal's communal 
nature comes from its modest, positive correlation with n 
Intimacy (Emmons & McAdams, 1989). 
Summary 
All of the motive and motive-like constructs employed 
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in the present study are thematically grounded in either 
agency or communion, both of which represent exceedingly 
broad contentual clusterings. Both agency and communion 
can be reduced to three defining facets or themes: 
separation, mastery, and domination, and unity, intimacy, 
and nurturance. The specific constructs and related 
measures employed in the present study cover all three 
agentic and communal facets at the implicit, striving, and 
self-attributed levels (see Table 1). Implicit agency, or 
n Agency, is connoted by McAdams' (1990) autobiographical 
agency measure, TAT n Power, and TAT n Achievement, while 
communion, or n Communion, is assessed by both McAdams' 
autobiographical communion measure and TAT n Intimacy. At 
the respondent level, agency, or san Agency, and 
communion, or san Communion, are each measured with the 
BSRI and ACL. Both the BSRI Masculinity scale and the 
combined ACL Achievement and Dominance scales cover 
agency's three facets. Similarly, communion is 
comprehensively covered by both BSRI Femininity and the 
ACL Nurturance/ACL Intraception composite. Finally, one 
striving construct is included for each of agency's 
facets. These striving-facet pairings are as follows: § 
Self-Sufficiency/agentic separation, § Power/agentic 
domination, and § Achievement/agentic mastery. Communion 
is represented at the striving level by § Intimacy and 2 
Interpersonal. 
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Table 1.--Classification of Agentic and Communal Motive 
Measures 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Agentic Facets Communal Facets 
Motive 
variables Sep Mas Dom Int Uni Nur 
Implicit Bio AG Bio AG Bio AG Bio CM Bio CM Bio CM 
Motives n Ach n Pow n Int 
strivings .e Ind .e Ach .e Pow ,einter 
(,eint) ,eint (,eint) 
Self- BSRI-M BSRI-M BSRI-M BSRI-F BSRI-F BSRI-F 
Attributed ACL AG ACL AG ACL AG ACL CM ACL CM ACL CM 
Motives 
Note. Parentheses indicate a secondary covering of the facet 
area. Sep = Separation facet; Mas = Mastery facet; Dom = 
Domination facet; Int = Intimacy facet; Uni = Unity facet; 
Nur = Nurturance facet; Bio AG = Autobiographical Agency; Bio 
Cm = Autobiographical Communion; n Ach = TAT-assessed n 
Achievement; n Pow = TAT-assessed n Power; n Int = TAT-
assessed n Intimacy; .e Ind = .e Self-Sufficiency/ Independence; 
.e Ach = .e Achievement; .e Pow = .e Power; .e Inter = .e 
Interpersonal; .e Int= .e Intimacy; BSRI-M = BSRI Masculinity; 
BSRI-F = BSRI Femininity; ACL AG = ACL Agency; ACL CM = ACL 
Communion. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES 
The present study seeks support for construct-based, 
as opposed to psychometric, explanations for operant and 
respondent motive measures' lack of relationship. There 
are in fact numerous reasons why implicit and self-
attributed motives should be normatively misaligned. 
Specifically, the two types of motive differ from each 
other in terms of operational mode, domain of behavioral 
influence, behavioral incentives, and developmental 
origins. Implicit motives are affect-based schemata that 
automatically influence spontaneous behavior and respond 
to behavioral incentives; self-attributed motives are 
conscious, verbal schemata that influence choice behavior 
in the face of social incentives. Furthermore, implicit 
motives stem from early, preverbal affective experiences, 
while self-attributed motives develop somewhat later, via 
internalization of verbalized parental/societal values. 
While implicit and self-attributed motives comprise 
.distinct motivational systems that need not be in accord, 
certain factors should nonetheless mediate intermotive 
relationships---if the whole implicit/self-attributed 
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framework is valid. First, inner-directedness, a tendency 
to focus attention on one's inner world, should relate to 
increased intermotive correspondence. Second, other-
directedness, a tendency to focus attention on social 
demands and guidelines, should result in decreased 
intermotive correspondence. Third, high inner-
directedness and low other-directedness should interact to 
produce a particularly high degree of intermotive 
correspondence. Finally, personality abilities and 
personal strivings should relate to implicit and self-
attributed motives in specific ways: personality abilities 
should relate more substantially to operant motives than 
do self-attributed motives, while personal strivings 
should relate to both implicit and self-attributed motives 
(For a summary of the reasoning informing the above 
propositions, see Chapter III). 
The above ideas are restated below as formal 
investigative hypotheses. For each proposition, two 
hypotheses are advanced--one for agentic motives and one 
for communal motives. Agentic motives are thematically 
organized around separation, mastery, and domination, 
while communal motives share a thematic basis in unity, 
intimacy, and nurturance. 
la. Increased inner-directedness will be related to 
increased correspondence between operant-agentic 
and respondent-agentic measures. 
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lb. Increased inner-directedness will be related to 
increased correspondence between operant-
communal and respondent-communal measures. 
2a. Decreased other-directedness will be related to 
increased correspondence between operant-agentic 
and respondent-agentic measures. 
2b. Decreased other-directedness will be related to 
increased correspondence between operant-
communal and respondent-communal measures. 
3a. Subjects high in inner-directedness and low in 
other-directedness will show a higher degree of 
agentic operant-respondent correspondence than 
other subjects; subjects low in inner-
directedness and high in other directedness will 
show a lower degree of agentic operant-
respondent correspondence than other subjects. 
3b. Subjects high in inner-directedness and low in 
other-directedness will show a higher degree of 
communal operant-respondent correspondence than 
other subjects; subjects low in inner-
directedness and high in other directedness will 
show a lower degree of communal operant-
respondent correspondence than other subjects. 
4a. Agentic personality abilities, tapped via 
maximal measures, will relate more strongly to 
operant-agentic measures than do respondent-
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agentic measures. 
4b. Communal personality abilities, tapped via 
maximal measures, will relate more strongly to 
operant-communal measures than do respondent-
communal measures. 
5a. Agentic personal strivings should relate to both 
operant-agentic and respondent-agentic measures, 
even if these measures do not relate to each 
other. 
Sb. Communal personal strivings should relate to 
both operant-communal and respondent-communal 
measures, even if these measures do not relate 




A sample of 133 undergraduate students was studied. 
All subjects were students in introductory psychology 
courses at a medium-sized urban midwestern university. 
Subjects received class credit in exchange for their 
participation. Two subjects from this overall sample were 
eliminated following their giving obvious misinformation 
on the demographics sheet (i.e., reporting their ages as 
106 and 95). Of the remaining 131 subjects, 67 (51%) were 
female and 64 (49%) were male. 
Procedure and Measures 
Subjects were run in groups of 15-20 in a single 
session lasting 1-3/4 hours. In all sessions, the same, 
single experimenter was present. At the beginning of the 
session, subjects were informed, "Today you will be taking 
a number of psychological measures." After 1) reading and 
signing a statement of informed consent and 2) entering 
their age and gender on a demographics sheet, subjects 
were administered the TAT following standard procedures 
for group administration (McAdams, 1979; Winter, 1973). 
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This consists of 6 pictures projected on a screen for 15 
seconds each. After each picture, subjects have 5 minutes 
to write an imaginative story based on the picture. 
Upon completion of the TAT, all subjects were given 
an initial test battery, along with the instructions: 
This packet contains a number of paper-and-pencil 
measures. When you are done with this packet, please 
raise your hand. I will then bring you a second 
packet which you will have the remainder of the 
session to complete. Finally, I would like to 
underscore that you may notice some similarities 
between various measures that you take today. 
Despite this, please try to answer each item on its 
own terms only, and do not worry about your previous 
responses to similar items on other measures. 
The comment in these instructions regarding item 
similarity was meant to discourage mechanical reproduction 
of BSRI responses on the maximal modification of the BSRI 
(B-MAX). At the end of the testing session, subjects were 
appropriately debriefed. 
The first test battery consisted of the following 
measures, listed in order of their appearance in the 
packet: 
(1) Peak Experience and Early Memory. Peak 
experience and early memory tasks were extracted from 
McAdams' (1990) more comprehensive Guided Autobiography 
packet. For both, subjects are first provided with 1) a 
general definition of one or the other type of life 
episode and 2) guidelines for written accounts of episode 
exemplars. A written example of a personal peak 
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experience or early memory is then solicited. In the case 
of peak experiences, subjects recount a personal high 
point, noting what happened in the episode, when it 
happened, relevant thoughts and feelings, and who was 
involved. Subjects also comment on the implications of 
the episode for their identity. The early memory task 
requests a written account of the subject's earliest clear 
episodic recollection. Subjects also estimate their age 
at the time of the episode and speculate on the 
personological ramifications of the memory. 
(2) Striving list. Emmons' (1988) striving list 
consists of 20 reproductions of the sentence stern, "I 
typically try to." Instructions identify strivings as 
"things that you typically or characteristically are 
trying to do in your everyday behavior," and subjects are 
encouraged to consider the life domains of work/school, 
home/family, social relationships, and leisure/recreation 
in identifying their strivings. No striving limit is 
provided, although subjects are asked to provide a minimum 
of 10. 
(3) Situational Variability Scale (SVS). The SVS is 
a three-item self-report questionnaire that asks subjects 
to rate their level on a given trait dimension (sample 
item: "In general, how friendly and outgoing are you?") 
and then their variability on that same dimension (sample 
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item: "How much do you vary from one situation to another 
in how friendly and outgoing you are?"). Both trait level 
and variability are rated on a seven-point Likert scale 
(l="Not at all;" ?="Extremely"). The three variability 
responses were summed to yield an overall behavioral 
variability index, while the three trait ratings were not 
employed. It is noteworthy that trait ratings on this 
scale are independent of variability ratings (Bern & Allen, 
1974). The SVS variability index has a coefficient alpha 
of .51 and has previously been found to mediate self-
report/behavior congruence (Bern & Allen, 1974; Wymer & 
Penner, 1985). 
(4) Personal Identity Scale. This six-item self-
report measure was extracted from Cheek and Briggs' (1982) 
larger Aspects of Identity Scale. Each item (sample item: 
"My emotions and feelings;" "My dreams and imagination") 
concerns a phenomenological domain; subjects are asked to 
rate each of these domains' self-definitional importance 
on a five-point Likert scale (O="Not at all important;" 
4="Extremely important"). Wymer and Penner (1985), 
obtained a coefficient alpha of .77 for the scale and also 
reported an unpublished "45-day test-retest reliability of 
.69 11 (p. 1006). This face valid measure comprises part of 
inner-directedness, which has been found to mediate self-
report/behavior congruence (Wymer & Penner, 1985). 
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(5) Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS). Fenigstein et 
al.'s (1975) SCS is a 17-item self-report instrument that 
measures both public and private self-consciousness. 
Although the entire measure was administered, only the 10-
item Private Self-Consciousness subscale is germane to the 
present study. Each item (sample items: "I'm always 
trying to figure myself out;" "I'm constantly examining my 
motives") is rated as to its self-relevance on a five-
point Likert scale (O="Extremely uncharacteristic;" 
4="Extremely characteristic"). Wymer and Penner (1985) 
computed a coefficient alpha of .59 for this scale, and 
Fenigstein et al. (1975) report a test-retest reliability 
of .79. Substantial validity data is available on 
private-self consciousness' relationship to both 
self-report/behavior congruence and affective awareness. 
(6) Bern Sex Role Inventory CBSRI). This 60-item 
self-report measure requires the test-taker to rate a 
series of potentially self-descriptive adjectives and 
phrases on a 7-point Likert scale (l="Never or almost 
never true;" 7="Always or almost always true"). For the 
sake of efficiency, only the BSRI items relevant to BSRI 
Masculinity or Femininity, as outlined earlier, were 
included on the form given to subjects. In line with the 
recommendations of Pedhazur and Tetenbaum (1979), item 
content for the Femininity Scale was altered to better fit 
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both abstract conceptualizations of communion and factor 
analytic findings. The researchers' further 
recommendation that the item, "Masculine," be dropped from 
the BSRI Masculinity Scale was also followed; the 
inclusion of a gender-based descriptor for a dimension 
that transcends gender seems inappropriate. Respective 
coefficient alphas for the standard BSRI Masculinity and 
Femininity scales are .78 and .87, while their test-retest 
reliabilities have been estimated at .85 and .86, over a 
4-week period (Bern, 1981). As discussed previously, the 
BSRI Masculinity and Femininity scales have undergone 
extensive validation. 
(7) Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS). Although only the 
SMS' Other Focus facet is of interest in the present 
study, the entire, 25-item instrument was administered. 
Each item is a self statement (sample items: " At parties 
and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say 
things that others will like" <false>; "In different 
situations with different people, I often act like very 
different persons" <true>). The test-taker endorses each 
of these statements as either true or false. Eleven of 
these items comprise the SMS Other Focus measure, which 
has a coefficient alpha of .70 (Wymer & Penner, 1985). 
Although test-retest reliability data is not available on 
just the Other Focus subscale, the whole SMS has a 
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reliability coefficient of .84, with a 1-month lag 
(Snyder, 1974). This highly face valid measure has been 
found in a previous study to mediate self-report/behavior 
congruence (Wymer & Penner, 1985). 
The measures comprising the second test battery, 
listed in order of appearance, were as follows: 
(1) Adjective Checklist CACL). A shortened, 152-item 
version of the 300-item ACL was devised such that only 
items relevant to the Achievement, Dominance, 
Intraception, and Nurturance scales were included. 
Subjects endorse adjectives as self-descriptive by placing 
an "X" next to them; the spaces next to inapplicable 
adjectives are simply left blank. Coefficient alphas for 
the Achievement, Dominance, Intraception, and Nurturance 
scales are .84, .79, .78, and .83, respectively. The 
scales' respective test-retest reliabilities, computed 
over a 6-month delay, are .73, .76, .61, and .73 (Gough & 
Heilbrun, 1983). As previously noted, the four scales 
have been validated against peer ratings and correlations 
with similar constructs from other psychological 
instruments. For the purposes of this study, ACL 
Achievement and Dominance scales were summed to yield an 
overall ACL Agency measure, and ACL Intraception and 
Nurturance were combined to yield ACL Communion. 
(2) Maximal modification of the BSRI CB-MAX). Items 
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from the BSRI Masculinity and Femininity scales, as 
outlined above, were inserted in the stem, "How are 
you capable of being?" to yield a maximal measure of 
agency and communion, or £ Agency and £ Communion. 
Although the items' order of appearance was switched from 
that of the BSRI, the BSRI's 7-point Likert scale format 
was preserved. The B-MAX is a purely experimental measure 
for which no consistency or reliability data exists. B-
MAX measures of £ Agency and £ Communion do, however, 
share their BSRI counterparts' substantial face validity 
as measures of agency and communion. 
Scoring Procedures 
After all data were collected, various thematic 
coding systems were implemented. The TAT protocols were 
scored according to the manuals for n Achievement 
(Atkinson, 1958), n Power (Winter, 1973), and n Intimacy 
(McAdams, 1984). Each motive was scored by a different 
trained scorer who had previously achieved acceptable 
agreement with expert scoring, both in terms of overall 
inter-rater reliability (i.e., 2=.86 or over) and category 
agreement in motive imagery (86% or over). The above 
three TAT measures exhibit internal consistencies that 
fall below the range accepted by traditional psychometric 
standards. In the case of n Achievement, for example, 
average inter-story correlations of .12 and .15 have been 
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obtained--both of which were nonsignificant (Biernat, 
1989). As discussed by Atkinson (1981) and McClelland 
(1980), however, there are solid, construct-based, as 
opposed to measurement error-based, reasons why 
homogeneity estimates for TAT measures should be low. 
Test-retest reliabilities for the above three TAT measures 
are also typically low, ranging from .10 to .35 
(McClelland, 1980). As noted earlier, however, these 
figures can be significantly increased when the 
variability demands tacit in standard TAT instructions are 
removed; explicit instructions that subjects may fully or 
partially reproduce previously written TAT stories result 
in enhanced reliability estimates. In the case of n 
Power, Winter and Stewart (1977) obtained an~ of .58, 
over a 6-8 day testing interval, while Lundy, as cited in 
McAdams (1982), obtained an~ of .48 for n Intimacy (one-
year retest delay). Similar figures have been documented 
for n Achievement (Heckhausen et al., 1985). All three 
motive measures have been extensively validated, as 
outlined earlier. 
Autobiographical and striving data were submitted to 
thematic analysis as well. Subjects' early memories and 
peak experiences, taken from the Guided Autobiography 
form, were scored according to McAdams' (1990) agency and 
communion coding system. This process culminated in a 
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single, overall autobiographical agency and 
autobiographical communion score for each subject. 
Striving lists, on the other hand, were scored for five of 
Emmons' (1988) striving categories: 2 Self-Sufficiency/ 
Independence, § Power, § Achievement, 2 Intimacy, and § 
Interpersonal. Actually, final scores for the first four 
of these striving dimensions reflect the quotient of the 
number of category-relevant strivings divided by the 
number of strivings provided. Final scores for § 
Interpersonal, the fifth striving dimension, express the 
ratio of interpersonal-to-intrapersonal strivings. 
Both Guided Autobiography responses and striving lists 
were independently scored by the experimenter and an 
assistant. Following this independent scoring, scoring 
discrepancies were discussed and resolved, such that each 
subject received one final score for each autobiographical 
or striving index. Both autobiographical and striving 
instruments are experimental measures for which no 
published internal consistency or test-retest reliability 
data is available. As already noted, both exhibit 




Composite measures of various mediator and motive 
variables were obtained through the summation of relevant 
facet measures. Composite inner- and other-directedness 
measure formation followed Wymer and Penner's (1985) 
factor analytically informed guidelines. Specifically, 
inner-directedness was operationalized as the T-score 
average of the Personal Identity Scale and the SCS' 
Private Self-Consciousness subscale. The T-scores from 
the SVS and the SMS Other Focus subscale were likewise 
averaged to yield a measure of other-directedness. 
Furthermore, the T-scores for 1) BSRI Masculinity and ACL 
Agency, and 2) BSRI Femininity and ACL Communion were 
averaged to yield composite measures of san Agency and san 
Communion, respectively. In addition to being 
conceptually justified (see Table 1, p. 115), these latter 
combinations were supported by obtained correlational 
patterns: BSRI Masculinity correlated strongly with ACL 
Agency, ~ (119) = .78, 2 < .001, and BSRI Femininity 
correlated substantially with ACL Communion, ~ (119) = 
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.58, R < .001. 
Correlational analyses of agentic/communal implicit 
and striving measures revealed a weak and inconsistent 
pattern of interrelation. The average correlation between 
n Achievement, n Power, and autobiographical agency was 
extremely low, rho= .15. In the realm of implicit 
communion, n Intimacy and autobiographical communion 
correlated at rho = -.08, ns. Similarly, the average 
correlation between the three agentic strivings was rho = 
.03, while§ Intimacy and§ Interpersonal correlated 
modestly, rho (128) = .28, 2 < .01. Especially in the 
case of the implicit motive measures, these results are 
not surprising. First, the autobiographical tasks 
immediately followed TAT administration, such that a 
subject's reported peak experience and early memory could 
be viewed as responses to (imaginary) "TAT cards 7 and 8. 11 
In lieu of the internal consistency figures typically 
obtained for TAT n Achievement, D Power, and n Intimacy 
measures, these two latter "stories" would not be expected 
to relate to the others strongly. On a similar note, the 
abridged autobiographical agency and communion measures 
employed in the present study can be likened to two-item 
tests: alone, they represent too small a sampling of 
operant behavior to overcome the sampling error associated 
with each response. However, they can, when combined with 
other operant responses, contribute meaningfully to a 
132 
larger instrument's overall validity. To the degree that 
personal strivings share some of the attributes of 
implicit motives, the obtained weak pattern of inter-
category relationships between agentic (and communal) 
strivings is also not surprising. 
Despite the low level of empirical relationship 
within implicit motive and striving domains, implicit 
motive and striving variables were nonetheless combined, 
via averaged sums of ~-scores, to yield composite agentic 
and communal measures (for a listing of various relevant 
facet measures, see Table 1, p. 115). Hence, n Agency 
reflects the average of n Achievement, n Power, and 
autobiographical agency, while n Communion reflects the 
average of n Intimacy and autobiographical communion. 
Composite measures of g Agency and g Communion are 
composed respectively of the following averages: g 
Achievement, g Power, and g Self-Sufficiency/Independence, 
and g Intimacy and g Interpersonal. It is expected that 
the by combining larger numbers of observations, more 
valid and more reliable striving and implicit motive 
indices will be obtained. 
For each of the five investigative hypotheses, 
analyses were conducted on both circumscribed and 
composite motive dimensions. Similarly, striving 
hypotheses were tested using both single and composite 
striving indices. For the sake of both brevity and 
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clarity, however, the ensuing report focuses exclusively 
on findings for composite motive and/or striving 
dimensions. Results for single motive and/or striving 
dimensions were generally nonsignificant. 
Preliminary Intercorrelations 
As a prelude to the empirical examination of 
investigative hypotheses, the baseline pattern of 
implicit/self-attributed motive relationship was examined 
via correlational analyses. Since n Agency and n 
Communion scores were highly skewed, the assumption of 
normality prerequisite to use of the Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient could not be met. Instead, 
the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rho), a 
nonparametric correlational technique, was employed. The 
results of these analyses, conducted on overall, female, 
and male samples, are summarized in Table 2. In the 
overall sample, moderate positive correlations between n 
Agency and san Agency, rho (109) = .22, Q < .05, and n 
Communion and san Communion, rho (104) = .22, Q < .05, 
were obtained. This general pattern, however, held in 
neither male nor female subsamples. Instead, contrasexual 
motives showed moderate to substantial associations, while 
gender-consistent motives were unrelated. For males, n 
Communion correlated positively with san Communion, rho 
(44) = .43, Q < .01, while n Agency and san Agency failed 
134 
Table 2.--Baseline Correlations Between Implicit and Self-
Attributed Motive Variables in Overall, Male, and Female 
Samples 
Self-
Attributed overall rn:=104 > Males rn:=44 > Females rn:=59) 
Motive 
Variables Il Ag Il Cm Il Ag Il Cm Il Ag Il Cm 
san Ag 22* -10 06 05 36** 00 
san Cm 05 22* -06 43** 198 08 
Note. san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure. 
san Cm = Composite self-attributed communion measure. 
n. Ag = Composite implicit agency measure. n. Cm = 
Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for 
each sample reflects the lowest N associated with a single 
correlational pairing within that sample's correlational 
block; variations between Ns within the same correlational 
block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing 
data associated with different correlational variables. 
a= 2 < .10 *2 < .05 **2 < .01 ***2 < .001. 
Decimals omitted. 
to interrelate, rho (50) = .06, 2 = ns. For females, on 
the other hand, n. Agency and san Agency evidenced a 
positive relationship, rho (59) = .36, 2 < .01, but n. 
Communion and san Communion did not, rho (60) = .08, ns. 
Mediation of Implicit/Self-Attributed Motive Relationships 
by Inner-Directedness 
Preliminary considerations. As a prelude to the 
testing of investigative hypotheses, subjects were divided 
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into high and low inner-directedness groups. For overall, 
male, and female samples, these divisions were based upon 
median splits. Respective medians for these three samples 
were 49.85, 48.69, and 50.84; respective distribution 
ranges were 39.54, 39.54, and 35.94. The decision to 
divide male and female samples based on within-sample 
medians rather than the overall median followed from a few 
considerations. First, the division of male and female 
samples based on the overall median resulted in lopsided 
Hs between low inner-directedness and high inner-
directedness groups. This lopsidedness in turn would have 
interacted with diminutive male and female sample sizes to 
seriously compromise statistical power. Dividing male and 
female samples according to within-sample medians, then, 
maximized statistical power. Admittedly, this sort of 
division hampers the generalizability of obtained within-
gender findings to an overall population of people high or 
low in inner-directedness (e.g., some of the females 
classified as "low inner-directedness'' in the female 
sample might actually fall in the "high inner-
directedness" group in the overall sample and in the 
population which the overall sample represents). However, 
the present investigation is more concerned with the 
relative effects of higher and lower inner-directedness 
rather than with the absolute effects of high and low 
inner-directedness. Hence, the issue of intersample 
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noncomparability is less problematic. 
Agency. The hypothesis that inner-directedness 
enhances agentic motive congruence was supported for 
neither overall, male, nor female samples. As a first 
step in hypothesis testing, a series of nonparametric n 
Agency / san Agency correlation coefficients was computed. 
Specifically, values were computed for high and low inner-
directedness groups from overall, male, and female 
samples. Tables 3 and 4 allow for the visual comparison 
of various correlational magnitudes. In the overall 
sample, n Agency and san Agency were essentially unrelated 
for high inner-directedness subjects, rho (56) = -.07, ns, 
while the two were substantially related for low inner-
directedness subjects, rho (49) = .45, 2 < .01. A similar 
pattern was obtained for females. Specifically, high 
inner-directedness was related to a marginal intermotive 
association, rho (29) = .27, 2 < .10, while low inner-
directedness was related to a substantial positive 
correlation, rho (27) = .45, 2 < .01. In the case of 
males, high inner-directedness was actually related to 
patent motive discordance, rho (25) = -.50, 2 < 
.01, while low inner-directedness was associated with a 
degree of motive accordance markedly above males' 
aforementioned nonsignificant baseline intermotive 
correlation, rho (24) = .43, 2 < .05. 
While visual analysis of various correlational 
Table 3.--correlations Between Implicit and Self-
Attributed Motive Variables for High and Low Inner-




Attributed High ID CH=52) Low ID CH=49) 
Motive 
Variables Il Ag n Cm n Ag n Cm 
san Ag -07 -11 45** -09 
san Cm 13 188 -22a 37** 
Note. High ID = Above median on composite inner-
directedness measure. Low ID = At or below median on 
composite inner-directedness measure. san Ag = Composite 
self-attributed agency measure. san Cm = Composite self-
attributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit 
agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion 
measure. The H cited for each sample reflects the lowest 
H associated with a single correlational pairing within 
that sample's correlational block; variations between Hs 
within the same correlational block reflect 
inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated 
with different correlational variables. 
a = R < .10 *R < .05 **R < .01 ***R < .001. 
Decimals omitted. 
magnitudes consistently suggests an unpredicted 
relationship between inner-directedness and decreased 
motive congruence, statistical analysis supports this 
relationship only in the case of men. For each subject, a 
discrepancy score was computed by taking the absolute 
value of the difference between n Agency and san Agency T-
scores. Mean discrepancy scores for high and low inner-
Table 4.--correlations Between Implicit and Self-
Attributed Motive Variables for High and Low Inner-















n Ag n cm n Ag n em n Ag n cm n Ag n em 
san Ag -50** 31 a 43* -07 27 8 -19 45** 25 
san Cm -01 54** -27 48** 12 14 15 08 
Note. High ID = Above median on composite inner-
directedness measure. Low ID = At or below median on 
composite inner-directedness measure. san Ag = Composite 
self-attributed agency measure. san Cm = Composite self-
attributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit 
agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion 
measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest 
N associated with a single correlational pairing within 
that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns 
within the same correlational block reflect 
inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated 
with different correlational variables. 
a = R < .10 *R < .05 **R < .01 ***R < .001. 
Decimals omitted. 
directedness groups were then compared using the Mann-
Whitney (MW) test for two independent samples. The 
average discrepancy score for high inner-directedness 
subjects did not differ significantly from that for low 
inner-directedness subjects in either overall, MW ~z 
(49,54) = -1.41, ns, or female, MW ~z (27,28) = -.22, ns, 
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samples. For males, however, low inner-directedness 
subjects evidenced marginally less discrepancy than did 
high inner-directedness subjects, MW Qz (24,25) = -1.92, 2 
< .10. 
Communion. As in the case of agency, communal 
intermotive correlations (i.e., n Communion with san 
Communion) suggest a counterintuitive relationship between 
inner-directedness and motive congruence (see Tables 3 and 
4). In the overall sample, n Communion and san Communion 
were only marginally related for high inner-directedness 
subjects, rho (52) = .18, 2 < .10, while the two were 
moderately and significantly related for low inner-
directedness subjects, rho (49) = .37, 2 < .01. 
Furthermore, low inner-directedness subjects, in 
comparison with those high in inner-directedness, had a 
significantly smaller intermotive discrepancy score, MW ~z 
(49,50) = -2.10, 2 < .05. 
Visual comparison of correlational data for the male 
sample suggests an absence of any sort of inner-
directedness effect (see Table 4). However, statistical 
comparison of average discrepancy scores for high and low 
inner-directedness males reveals a significant difference, 
MW Qz (24,20) = -2.26, 2 < .05. Males below median in 
inner-directedness show more n Communion - san Communion 
congruence than above-median males. In the case of 
females, both visual comparison of correlational data and 
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statistical comparison of average discrepancy scores 
suggests the absence of an inner-directedness effect, MW 
Qz (27,29) = -.19, ns. 
Mediation of Implicit/Self-Attributed Motive Relationships 
by Other-Directedness 
Preliminary considerations. Median splits were 
employed to divide subjects into various high and low 
other-directedness groups. Respective medians for other-
directedness in overall, male, and female samples were 
50.74, 48.33, and 51.48, while the respective ranges were 
33.97, 33.97, and 31.23. Median splits for male and 
female samples employed within-sample medians, rather than 
the overall median. This decision followed from the same 
considerations advanced in regard to inner-directedness. 
Specifically, within-sample median splits ensure 
relatively equal Ns between high and low other-
directedness groups. Hence, within-sample median splits 
maximize statistical power. Additionally, the present 
study is primarily concerned with the differential effects 
of relatively higher levels and relatively lower levels of 
other-directedness; the generalizability of obtained 
findings to distinct, normatively defined high and low 
other-directedness populations, which within-sample median 
splits hinder, is of secondary importance. 
Agency. The hypothesis that low other-directedness 
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is related to enhanced congruence between n Agency and san 
Agency was not supported for overall and male samples. 
Mann-Whitney analyses revealed a lack of significant 
difference between average intermotive discrepancy scores 
in the overall sample, MW ~z (51,54) = .17, ns, and in the 
male sample, MW ~z (22,25) = 1.49, ns. Comparison of n 
Agency - san Agency correlations also suggests the absence 
of a notable other-directedness effect (see Tables 5 and 
6). In the overall sample, agentic intermotive 
correlations for high and low other-directedness subjects 
were of the same general magnitude; respective values were 
rho (56) = .27, 2 < .05, and rho (49) = .14, ns. 
Similarly, intermotive correlations were weak and 
nonsignificant for high and low other-directedness males. 
In the case of females, results are inconclusive. 
Statistical comparison of average discrepancy scores for 
high and low other-directedness groups is consistent with 
the investigative hypotheses: females low in other-
directedness evidence marginally less inter-motive 
discrepancy than do females high in other-directedness, MW 
~z (29,30) = -1.53, 2 < .10. However, this relationship 
is not supported correlationally (see Table 6). 
Specifically, n Agency and san Agency correlate moderately 
and positively for high other-directedness females, rho 
(30) = .36, g < .05, while correlating nonsignificantly 
for females low in other-directedness, rho (49) = .20, ns. 
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Table 5.--Correlations Between Implicit and Self-
Attributed Motive Variables for High and Low Other-
Directedness Subjects in overall Sample 
Self-
Attributed High OD rn:=54) Low OD (.li=48) 
Motive 
Variables n Ag n Cm n Ag n Cm 
san Ag 27* 01 14 -29* 
san Cm 208 13 -15 32* 
Note. High OD = Above median on composite other-
directedness measure. Low OD = At or below median on 
composite other-directedness measure. san Ag = Composite 
self-attributed agency measure. san Cm = Composite self-
attributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit 
agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion 
measure. The .li cited for each sample reflects the lowest 
.li associated with a single correlational pairing within 
that sample's correlational block; variations between Hs 
within the same correlational block reflect 
inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated 
with different correlational variables. 
a = R < .10 *R < .05 **R < .01 ***R < .001. 
Decimals omitted. 
Given the small sample sizes associated with these two 
correlational figures, the difference in magnitudes is 
probably negligible; it is, however, clear that females 
low in other-directedness show no enhanced correlational 
intermotive congruence relative to high other-directedness 
females. In conclusion, then, the confirmatory Mann-
Whitney finding is somewhat mitigated by nonsupportive 
Table 6.--correlations Between Implicit and self-
Attributed Motive Variables for High and Low Other-
Directedness Subjects in Male and Female Samples 
Males Females 
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Self- High OD Low OD High OD Low OD 
Attributed rn:=24 > rn:=1a> (N=30) CN=29) 
Motive 
Variables n Ag n Cm n Ag n Cm n Ag n Cm n Ag n Cm 
san Ag 13 14 10 -06 36* -09 20 04 
san Cm 12 43* -37* 54* 23 -14 04 20 
Note. High OD = Above median on composite other-
directedness measure. Low OD = At or below median on 
composite other-directedness measure. san Ag = Composite 
self-attributed agency measure. san Cm = Composite self-
attributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit 
agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion 
measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest 
N associated with a single correlational pairing within 
that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns 
within the same correlational block reflect 
inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated 
with different correlational variables. 
a = Q < .10 *R < .05 **R < .01 ***R < .001. 
Decimals omitted. 
correlational data: support for other-directedness' 
negative effect on agentic motive congruence is limited. 
Communion. In the overall sample, low and high 
other-directedness groups did not differ significantly in 
n Communion - san Communion discrepancy, although 
differences were in the predicted direction, MW ~z (48,52) 
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= -.23, ns. Visual comparison of interrnotive correlations 
additionally suggests some degree of other-directedness 
effect (see Table 5): n Communion and san Communion 
correlate significantly and positively for low other-
directedness subjects, rho (48) = .32, 2 < .05, while they 
failed to do so for high other-directedness subjects, rho 
(54) = .13, ns. Hence, both correlational and Mann-
Whitney data suggest a low-level, nonsignificant other-
directedness effect in the predicted direction. 
Inconsistent and divergent other-directedness effects 
were obtained in both male and female subsamples. In the 
case of females, other-directedness' predicted, 
detrimental effect on n Communion - san Communion 
congruence was supported. Low other-directedness females 
evidenced marginally less intermotive discrepancy than did 
high other-directedness females, MW ~z (30,30) = -1.49, 2 
< .10. It is notable, however, that even for females low 
in other-directedness, n Communion and san Communion were 
not significantly intercorrelated, rho (30) = .20, ns. 
The other-directedness effect obtained for males was the 
reverse of that predicted: high other-directedness males 
show less interrnotive discrepancy than do low other-
directedness males, MW ~z (18,23) = 1.97, p < .05. 
However, this unpredicted result was not supported 
correlationally (see Table 6): n Communion and san 
Communion correlate at the same order of magnitude for 
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high other-directedness males, rho (24) = .43, 2 < .05, 
and low other-directedness males, rho (18) = .54, 2 < .05. 
combined Mediational Effects of Inner-Directedness and 
Other-Directedness 
Due to the extreme skewedness of n Agency and n 
communion scores, the assumption of normality prerequisite 
to the use of ANOVAs could not be met. As a less 
definitive alternative to ANOVAs, the hypothesis that high 
inner-directedness and low other-directedness maximize 
intermotive correspondence was examined correlationally 
(see Table 7). Specifically, subjects were divided, via 
median split, into four groups based on their level of 
inner-directedness and other-directedness. The groups 
were as follows: H/H (high inner-directedness; high 
other-directedness), H/L (high inner-directedness; low 
other-directedness), L/H (low inner-directedness; high 
other-directedness), and L/L (low on both inner- and 
other-directedness). 
The prediction that H/L subjects would evidence 
enhanced intermotive congruence was generally not 
supported (see Table 7). In the case of agency, L/H 
subjects evidenced the highest degree of n Agency - san 
Agency correspondence, rho (27) = .47, 2 < .01, followed 
by L/L subjects, rho (22) = .25, ns. Agentic intermotive 
correspondence was essentially negligible for H/L 
Table 7.--Correlations Between Implicit and Self-





Attributed H/H rn:=24> H/L (N=26) L/H (N=27) L/L (N=22) 
Motive 
variables n Ag !l Cm !l Ag !l CM !l Ag n Cm D Ag !l Cm 
san Ag -06 -15 -04 -24 47** 21 25 -44* 
san Cm 24 -04 01 29 8 -07 40* -50** 41* 
Note. H/H = Above-median on inner- and other-
directedness. H/L = Above-median on inner-directedness 
and below-median on other-directedness. L/H = Below-
median on inner-directedness and above-median on other-
directedness. L/L = Below-median on inner- and other-
directedness. san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency 
measure. san Cm = Composite self-attributed communion 
measure. n. Ag = Composite implicit agency measure. n. Cm = 
Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for 
each sample reflects the lowest H associated with a single 
correlational pairing within that sample's correlational 
block; variations between Ns within the same correlational 
block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing 
data associated with different correlational variables. 
a = Q < .10 *R < .05 **R < .01 ***R < .001. 
Decimals omitted. 
subjects, rho (28) = -.04, ns, and H/H subjects, rho (26) 
= -.06, ns. The same pattern was evident in the case of 
communion. Again, L/H and L/L subjects showed the highest 
degree of intermotive correlation: respective values for 
the groups were rho (27) = .40, R < .05, and rho (22) = 
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.41, p < .05. The magnitude of communal intermotive 
relationship was only somewhat smaller for H/L subjects, 
rho (26) = .29, p < .10, while it was negligible for H/H 
subjects, rho (24) = -.04, ns. In summary, these results 
seem to suggest a main effect for inner-directedness 
rather than an inner-directedness X other-directedness 
interaction. Contrary to predictions, then, low inner-
directedness is related to enhanced intermotive 
congruence, regardless of level of other-directedness. 
Unfortunately, low Ns precluded a meaningful analysis of 
male and female samples. 
Comparative Relationships of Personalitv Abilities and 
Self-Attributed Motives to the Implicit Domain 
Agency. The general hypothesis that agentic 
personality abilities (£Agency), assessed via the BMAX, 
would relate more strongly to n Agency than would BSRI-
assessed san Agency was tested via nonparametric analyses. 
This statistical decision followed from n Agency's highly 
skewed distribution. Each subject was assigned an 
operant-respondent discrepancy score (i.e., the absolute 
value of the difference between n Agency and san Agency T-
scores) and an operant-ability discrepancy score (i.e., 
the absolute value of the difference between n Agency and 
g Agency T-scores) . Differences between mean operant-
respondent and operant-ability discrepancy scores were 
then tested via the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks 
Test, a nonparametric analog to the t-test. 
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Hypotheses were supported for neither overall, male, 
nor female samples. More specifically, the Wilcoxon 
Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test yielded nonsignif icant 
results in each case. Respective values for overall, 
male, and female samples were as follows: WX Tz (108) = 
-.30, ns, WX Tz (49) = -.72, ns, and WX Tz (59) = -.22, 
ns. It is however notable that mean differences were in 
the correct direction in all three cases. Nonsignificant 
group differences were further examined via Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients (rho), computed for n Agency -
.§.fill Agency and for n Agency - ft Agency. The results of 
these correlational analyses, conducted on overall, male, 
and female samples, are presented in Table 8. Again, ft 
Agency was more highly correlated with n Agency than was 
san Agency in all three samples. Hence, group differences 
consistently fell in predicted directions, although they 
were not significant. 
Communion. A series of analyses analogous to those 
conducted for agency was conducted for communion. This 
time, san Communion was operationalized as BSRI Femininity 
to ensure item comparability with the BSRI-derived BMAX 
measure of ft Communion. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
Signed-Ranks Test was used to compare n Communion - san 
Communion and n Communion - ft Communion difference scores. 
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Table 8.--Comparatve Correlations of Self-Attributed 
Motives and Personality Abilities with Implicit Motives 
in Overall, Male, and Female Samples 
Overall rn:=105) Males rn:=44 > Females rn:=6o) 
Motive 
Variables Il Ag n Cm Il Ag n Cm Il Ag n Cm 
san Ag 21* -10 06 09 32** -05 
s Ag 34*** -01 28* 07 44*** 14 
san Cm 04 19* -05 41** 188 01 
a Cm 17* 23** 12 24* 22* 20 8 
Note. san Ag = BSRI Masculinity scale. ,a Ag = BMAX-
assessed agentic personality abilities. san Cm = BSRI 
communion scale. ,a Cm = BMAX-assessed communal 
personality abilities. n Ag = Composite implicit agency 
measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion measure. 
The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest N 
associated with a single correlational pairing within that 
sample's correlational block; variations between Ns within 
the same correlational block reflect inconsistencies in 
the amount of missing data associated with different 
correlational variables. 
8 
= 2 < .10 *2 < .05 **2 < .01 ***2 < .001. 
Decimals omitted. 
As in the case of agency, hypotheses were supported in 
neither overall, male, nor female samples. The respective 
values for the three groups were WX ~z (103) = -.39, ns, 
WX ~z (43) = .18, ns, and WX ~z (60) = -.56, ns. Relevant 
correlational follow-up analyses, the results of which 
appear in Table a, were also implemented. In the case of 
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females, results were in the predicted direction: g 
communion was more strongly correlated with n Communion, 
rho {61) = .20, 2 < .10, than was san communion, rho {61) 
= .01, ns, though apparently not at a significant level. 
Visual analysis of the male sample suggests a 
nonsignificant opposing trend, such that san Communion is 
more highly related to n Communion, rho (44) = .41, 2 < 
.01, than is g Communion, rho (48) = .24, 2 < .05. For 
the overall sample, differences between correlational 
magnitudes were negligible. 
Personal Strivings and the Bi-Level Motivational System 
The twin hypotheses that (1) strivings are more 
closely related to implicit motives than are self-
attributed motives and (2) strivings are more closely 
related to self-attributed motives than are implicit 
motives were both tested via a series of Wilcoxon Matched-
Pairs Signed-Ranks tests. This decision followed from 
both implicit motives' and personal strivings' routinely 
skewed distributions. Wilcoxon (WX) comparisons were made 
between pairs of discrepancy scores, which reflected the 
absolute value of various T-score differences. In the 
case of agency, for example, §Agency/ n Agency and § 
Agency/san Agency discrepancy scores were compared to an n 
Agency/san Agency discrepancy baseline. A comparable 
series of comparisons were made in the case of communion. 
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Relative alignments of strivings and self-attributed 
motives with implicit motives. The hypothesis that 
strivings are more closely related to implicit motives 
than are self-attributed motives received some support in 
the case of agency. As predicted, g Agency was more 
closely related to n Agency than was .fil!Il Agency, WX Tz 
(109) = -2.84, p < .01. Furthermore, this relationship 
held for both males, WX Tz (51) = -2.29, p < .05, and 
females, WX Tz (58) = -1.83, p < .10. It is notable that 
these confirmatory relationships were not evident in 
correlational analyses, which are more sensitive to 
extreme scores (see Table 9). For the male sample, g 
Agency - n Agency and san Agency - n Agency correlations 
were extremely weak and nonsignificant. Visual inspection 
of the female sample suggests that if anything, san Agency 
is more strongly related to n Agency, rho (59) = .36, 12 < 
.01, than is g Agency, rho (62) = .09, ns. 
The prediction that § Communion would relate more 
strongly to n Communion than would san Communion was 
supported in neither overall, male, nor female samples. 
In all three cases, Wilcoxon comparisons yielded 
nonsignificant results that were, however, in the correct 
direction. Respective values for overall, male, and 
female samples were WX Tz (104) = -.77, ns, WX Tz (45) = 
-.74, ns, and WX Tz (59) = -.27, ns. Parallel 
correlational analyses mirrored Wilcoxon results for 
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Table 9.--comparatve Correlations of Self-Attributed 
Motives and Personal Strivings with Implicit Motives in 
Overall, Male, and Female Samples 
Overall rn:=104 > Males (N=44) Females (N=59) 
Motive 
variables Il Ag n Cm Il Ag n Cm Il Ag n Cm 
san Ag 22* -10 06 05 36** 00 
.§. Ag 07 -22** 05 -01 09 -22* 
san Cm 05 22* -06 43** 198 08 
§? Cm 128 03 07 208 188 -09 
Note. san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure • 
.§. Ag = Composite striving agency measure. san Cm = 
Composite self-attributed communion measure. .§. cm = 
Composite striving communion measure. n Ag = composite 
implicit agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit 
communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects 
the lowest N associated with a single correlational 
pairing within that sample's correlational block; 
variations between Ns within the same correlational block 
reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data 
associated with different correlational variables. 
a= R < .10 *R < .05 **R < .01 ***R < .001. 
Decimals omitted. 
females but not for males (see Table 9). For females, n 
Communion was equally unrelated to both san Communion, rho 
(60) = .08, ns, and.§. Communion, rho (62) = -.09, ns. For 
males, however, n Communion was substantially more related 
to san Communion, rho (44) = .43, R < .01, than to .§. 
Communion, rho (57) = .20, R < .10. 
153 
Relative alignments of strivings and implicit motives 
with self-attributed motives. The prediction that g 
Agency would be more closely aligned with san Agency than 
would n Agency was supported only in the case of males, 
where a marginally significant effect in the correct 
direction was obtained, WX Tz (51) = -1.29, p < .10. 
Visual inspection of correlational data further suggests 
that strivings may be more strongly related to san Agency 
than implicit motives for males (see Table 10) : g Agency 
and san Agency correlate moderately and significantly, rho 
(58) = .29, 2 < .05, while n Agency and san Agency do not, 
rho (50) = .06, ns. For females, a significant effect in 
the opposite direction was obtained, such that n Agency 
was more closely aligned with san Agency than was g 
agency, WX Tz (58) = -2.20, p < .05. This 
counterintuitive relationship was also supported 
correlationally, where the n Agency - san Agency 
correlation was sizable and significant, rho (59) = .36, 2 
< .01, and the g Agency - san Agency relationship was 
negligible, rho {62) = .02, ns. The divergent 
relationships associated with female and male subsamples 
combined to produce a nonsignif icant effect in the overall 
sample, WX Tz (109) = -.57, ns. 
The hypothesis that g Communion would relate more 
strongly to san Communion than would n Communion received 
support in the female sample, WX Tz (59) = -1.44, 2 < .10. 
Table 10.--Comparatve Correlations of Implicit Motives 
and Personal Strivings with Self-Attributed Motives in 
Overall, Male, and Female Samples 
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Overall (!!=104) Males (!!=44) Females (!!=59) 
Motive 
Variables san Ag san Cm san Ag san Cm san Ag san Cm 
n Ag 22* 05 06 -06 36** 198 
§. Ag 22** 01 29* -04 02 09 
n Cm -10 22* 05 43** 00 08 
§. Cm 19* 47*** 13 38** 27* 54*** 
Note. san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure. 
§. Ag = Composite striving agency measure. san Cm = 
Composite self-attributed communion measure. §. Cm = 
Composite striving communion measure. n Ag = Composite 
implicit agency measure. n cm = Composite implicit 
communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects 
the lowest N associated with a single correlational 
pairing within that sample's correlational block; 
variations between Ns within the same correlational block 
reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data 
associated with different correlational variables. 
a = 2 < .10 *R < .05 **R < .01 ***R < .001. 
Decimals omitted. 
Actually, this effect appears quite robust when viewed 
correlationally (see Table 10). While n Communion and san 
Communion were essentially unrelated, rho (60) = .08, ns, 
.e_ Communion and san Communion were substantially related, 
rho (63) = .54, 2 < .001. For males, communal strivings 
and implicit motives were equally related to .§..9..D. 
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Communion, WX Tz (45) = -.40, ns. Correlational analysis 
further corroborates this conclusion: san Communion is 
moderately related to both n Communion, rho (44) = .43, Q 
< ;01, and~ Communion, rho (57) = .38, Q < .01. The 
striving effect observed in the female sample was 
reflected in a marginally significant, confirmatory 
striving effect in the overall sample, WX Tz (104) = 
-1.37, p < .10, which was also supported correlationally. 
CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION 
Motive Congruence Revisited: Baseline Relationships 
Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives 
The present investigation sought to gain support for 
a particular explanation for a well-documented problem. 
The problem, simply stated, is that operant and respondent 
measures of the same motive content "seldom correlate 
significantly with one another" {McClelland et al., 1989, 
p. 691). By showing that operant and respondent motive 
measures do in fact relate for people high and/or low in 
certain conceptually relevant variables, the present 
investigation aimed to empirically bolster McClelland et 
al.'s {1989) construct-based explanation for this lack of 
intermeasure relationship. Their account contends that 
overall, operant and respondent motive measures are 
unrelated, because the implicit and self-attributed motive 
systems that they respectively tap are normatively out of 
alignment. This explanation stands in opposition to the 
measure-based explanations of Entwisle {1972), Raven 
(1988), and others, which implicate psychometric 
shortcomings of operant or respondent measures as the 
culprit for motive incongruity. 
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Undoubtedly, the most important finding of the 
present investigation concerns McClelland et al.'s (1989) 
assumption of a normative lack of intermotive 
relationship. This assumption, in short, is not supported 
by the current data. For both males and females, 
contrasexual implicit and self-attributed motive systems 
showed an unexpectedly high degree of correspondence. In 
the case of males, n Communion and san communion 
displayed a substantial positive association. Similarly, 
n Agency and san Agency were appreciably interrelated for 
females. Gender-congruent implicit and self-attributed 
motive systems, on the other hand, evidenced the 
negligible degree of interrelationship that would be 
expected based upon prior research. 
The unexpected pattern of obtained results warrants 
two types of explanation. First, the failure of this sort 
of pattern to surf ace in previous research must be 
addressed, and second, the pattern itself must be 
interpreted. In regard to the former, it is noteworthy 
that the present investigation employed composite implicit 
and self-attributed motive measures, where past 
investigations have examined only single motive facets, 
such as n Intimacy or san Power. Undoubtedly, the 
combination of many more observations into single 
composite measures yielded more valid implicit and self-
attributed motive measures. The enhanced validity, in 
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turn, probably allowed for the apprehension of a 
relationship previously obscured by substantial random 
error. This explanation is particularly germane to 
implicit motive measurement, as the popular TAT measures 
typically sample only a very small portion of operant 
behavior (i.e., six imaginative stories). The above 
speculations are upheld by analysis of operant and 
respondent facet intercorrelations: correlational 
pairings of single operant with single respondent facets 
generally yielded positive relationships of negligible 
magnitude. It appears, then, that measure-based 
explanations for implicit and self-attributed motive 
measures' lack of interrelation are somewhat on target, as 
the more comprehensive assessment of operant behavior and 
respondent behavior brings into relief previously 
concealed interrnotive patterns. Alternately, the obtained 
pattern of baseline intermotive relationships may be 
understood as a fluke, although the occurrence of the same 
pattern in independent male and female samples (i.e., 
contrasexual motive interelatedness; gender-consistent 
motive unrelatedness) renders this explanation unlikely. 
Although unpredicted, the obtained intermotive 
relationships actually make sense upon scrutiny. However, 
before explanations can be advanced, some basic 
distinctions between the two motivational systems must be 
reiterated. The implicit motivational system can be 
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likened to Freud's (1962) id, Winnicott's (1965) True Self, 
and Rogers' (1963) directional organismic processes, 
or organismic self: implicit motives constitute a basic, 
true psychic reality--a set of phenomenological 
coordinates to which the conscious personality must in 
some way adapt, whether through expression, repression, 
dissociation, or denial. The implicit system, 
furthermore, is largely inherited and constitutional, 
although life experiences can facilitate the 
crystallization of inherent motivational potentials into 
formal motive dispositions (McClelland & Pilon, 1983). 
While the implicit system represents constitutional 
nature, the self-attributed system reflects internalized 
nurture, much like the psychodynamic ego and superego 
(Freud, 1933). In the normative case, then, the self-
attributed system reflects parental-societal standards as 
they pertain to personal identity. The crucial point for 
the purposes of the present discussion is that these 
standards differ in content and emphasis for men and 
women; men are taught to be agentic, or masculine, and 
women are taught to be communal, or feminine (Birns, 1976; 
Block, 1976; Brooks-Gunn & Matthews, 1979; Edwards & 
Whiting, 1983). While individual parents certainly vary 
in their espousal and subsequent inculcation of sex-typed 
versus androgenous gender roles, it is nonetheless clear 
that overall, men and women receive very different 
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messages as to who they are and who they should be. 
The obtained pattern of {l) gender-congruent motive 
non-relation, and (2) contrasexual motive co-relation 
makes sense when considered against the above conceptual 
backdrop. Boys acquire comprehensive, differentiated 
agentic self-attributed motives and girls acquire 
similarly extensive, articulated communal self-attributed 
motives. Furthermore, these gender-congruent self-
attributed motives are based in pat social ideologies, 
rather than in personal motivational idiosyncrasies. By 
definition, then, they will normatively be somewhat 
misaligned with the individual's implicit motivational 
make-up, as was evident in the present investigation. It 
is also probable that boys and girls receive much less 
explicit training in regard to contrasexual aspects of 
identity. In other words, boys receive comparatively little 
explicit information, reward, or punishment in 
connection with being or not being nurturant, intimate, 
and connected; girls likewise receive relatively less 
explicit shaping in regard to dominance, autonomy, and 
achievement. While these latter two premises may sound 
somewhat dated, it is notable that the parents of the 
participants in the present study received their sex-role 
training in the 1950s. If the above assumptions are 
correct, then the development of contrasexual self-
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attributed motives should be less related to the 
internalization of parental-societal imperatives that 
McClelland et al. (1989) postulate. Instead, self-
attributed motive acquisition should follow from the 
gradual, verbal representation of experienced implicit 
realities. Such a process would result in a much higher 
degree of intermotive correspondence, as was obtained. 
Alternately, it may be that in the normative case, 
contrasexual self-attributed motives remain much less 
developed than gender-congruent contrasexual motives. 
Conceptual judgments about personal attributes, as 
solicited by respondent motive questionnaires, may involve 
a cognitive review of memories of operant behavior rather 
than consultation with an abstract, stable self schema. 
Again, the latter process would explain the high level of 
operant-respondent correspondence procured. 
Intermotive Congruence and Self-Consciousness Variables 
Inner-directedness. Contrary to predictions, inner-
directedness did not enhance motive congruence. In fact, 
comparison of pertinent correlational magnitudes and mean 
differences at times suggests an opposite effect, such 
that inner-directedness is related to decreased motive 
congruence. This trend was especially evident in the case 
of males and agency, where division of subjects into high 
and low inner-directedness groups shed new light on males' 
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negligible baseline intermotive correspondence. 
Specifically, males low in inner-directedness evidence 
substantial agentic intermotive congruence, while high 
inner-directedness males display equally substantial 
intermotive discordance. In both male and female samples, 
inner-directedness was related to decreased contrasexual 
intermotive congruence, albeit inconsistently. Inner-
directedness had no effect on gender-congruent intermotive 
congruence for females. In three out of four cases, then, 
some evidence related low inner-directedness to enhanced 
congruence. 
Although the above results were not predicted, the 
existence of any sort of inner-directedness effect on 
intermotive congruence is somewhat supportive of 
McClelland et al. 's (1989) position. The fact that a 
psychological construct mediates correspondence seems more 
supportive of construct-based as opposed to measure-based 
interpretations. In other words, it is unclear why a 
self-consciousness variable should affect operant-
respondent relationships if one or the other measure type 
is generally invalid. If operant and respondent measures 
typically fail to relate due to psychometric problems, 
then improvement of the measures alone, and not selection 
of certain types of subjects, should bolster congruence. 
Instead, both the unexpected baseline patterns of 
intermotive relationship and the unpredicted results for 
inner-directedness suggest a psychological rather than 
psychometric explanation. 
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Actually, the obtained results suggest a framing of 
inner-directedness vis-a-vis the bi-level motivational 
system that departs from that advanced earlier. Inner-
directedness is clearly not a cause or agent of 
intermotive congruence. Instead, it may be a product or 
effect of motive misalignment. Discrepancy between 
implicit and self-attributed systems seems an apt 
operationalization of general neurosis. Rogers (1963), 
for example, comments: 
Estrangement of conscious man from his directional 
organismic processes is not a necessary part of man's 
nature ..• The satisfaction ..• of the actualizing 
tendency has become bifurcated into incompatible 
behavior systems. This dissociation which exists in 
most of us is the pattern and basis of all 
psychological pathology in man (p. 24) 
Similarly, psychodynamic theorists such as Freud (1933) 
identify unresolved incongruities between id (i.e., 
implicit system) and superego (i.e., self-attributed 
system) as a basis for neurotic conflict. In the context 
of neurotic conflict, inner-directedness takes-on a 
different connotation from that typically presented. 
Rather than with openness to experience and an 
integration-fostering self-focus, inner-directedness may 
be closely allied with defensive aims. Inner-
directedness, especially as assessed via respondent 
questionnaire, may represent the self-attributed system's 
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attempt at managing implicit presses at odds with the 
self-image. Along these lines, Shabad (1991) reflects: 
The analytical function of scrutinizing behavior, or 
consciously observing before participating, reflects 
a radical mistrust of unconscious impulses and their 
corollary actions ... Indeed, as one gains in self-
knowledge, one increasingly becomes equipped also 
with a foreknowledge that enables one to avoid 
unconscious patterns of ... behavior (p. 10) 
Inner-directedness' private self-consciousness facet is in 
fact related to low self-esteem, a general marker of 
neurotic conflict (Turner et al., 1978). 
From a psychodynamic perspective, intermotive 
misalignment is reframed as neurotic conflict, and inner-
directedness becomes mental vigilance. Furthermore, this 
reframing affords coherence to previously incomprehensible 
results. Mental vigilance is a normative response to 
neurotic conflict, and retrospectively, it makes sense 
that inner-directedness would be related to intermotive 
misalignment rather than alignment. Past research on 
private self-consciousness, the more well-researched of 
inner-directedness' two facets, can also be assimilated by 
the above interpretation. First, a number of studies have 
linked private self-consciousness to increased self-
report/behavior congruence (Scheier et al., 1978; Turner, 
1978). From the present vantage, private self-
consciousness is the tool with which the self-attributed 
system brings "the unpredictable dynamics of a given 
process under omnipotent mental control" (Shabad, 1991, p. 
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8). Hence, individuals high in private self-consciousness 
"do what they say,'' because they have achieved conscious 
control over implicit sectors that remain unfettered in 
others. Furthermore, their higher aggressiveness 
(Scheier, 1976) represents the price paid for chronic 
overcontrol: "it is often what is ruled out that rises 
and asserts itself, so there is not mastery precisely 
where mastery ought to be" (Bakan, 1966, p. 89). 
Other-directedness. The hypothesis that other-
directedness is related to decreased intermotive 
congruence received support only in the case of females' 
communal motives. Specifically, communal intermotive 
correspondence was higher for women low in other-
directedness than for women high in other-directedness. 
Female agentic intermotive correspondence failed to be 
consistently and substantially affected by other-
directedness. The results for males suggest an absence of 
other-directedness effect in the case of agency. 
Likewise, other-directedness is probably unrelated to 
communal intermotive alignment in males, although some 
inconsistent evidence suggested an unpredicted 
relationship between other-directedness and enhanced 
communal motive correspondence. If nothing else, the 
obtained pattern of results underscores the differences 
between masculine and feminine psychologies. It may well 
be that other-directedness has a different meaning or 
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dynamic significance for the male psyche than for the 
female psyche. Unfortunately, the present investigation 
was not equipped to further elucidate such differences. 
Earlier, other-directedness was framed as a probable 
facilitator of intermotive incongruence. As with inner-
directedness, however, it may be more accurate to consider 
other-directedness as a symptom or result of intermotive 
misalignment, or general neurotic conflict. In fact, both 
person-centered (e.g., Rogers, 1959) and psychodynamic 
(e.g., Kohut & Wolfe, 1978; Winnicott, 1965) theories 
"predict that the wider the discrepancy between one's 
public and private selves (i.e., implicit and self-
attributed systems), the greater the individual's anxiety, 
conformity, and sensitivity to social cues suggesting 
appropriate behavior" (Tunnell, 1984, p. 549). If this is 
correct, then the absence of a clear other-directedness 
effect for males, combined with the aforementioned robust, 
unpredicted inner-directedness effect, may suggest a 
certain approach to managing chronic psychological duress. 
Specifically, intense inner scrutiny may be preferable to 
conformity and other-focus, as it preserves a sense of 
agentic self-reliance, which is a cornerstone of the 
normative male ideal (Bern, 1981). Females, on the other 
hand, seem to prefer communal adaptations to inner 
misalignment, and may also be more adaptationally 
flexible, turning to both other- and inner-directedness. 
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It was also hypothesized in the present investigation 
that inner- and other-directedness would interact so as to 
maximize intermotive correspondence. This hypothesis 
could not be definitively examined due to (1) operant 
indices' skewed distributions, and (2) small Ns, which 
precluded within-gender analyses. Visual inspection of 
correlational data, however, suggests (very tentatively) 
an absence of any form of summative effect. 
Relationships Between Motives and Motive-Like Constructs 
Personality abilities. Contrary to predictions, 
agentic and communal personality abilities were no more 
aligned with the implicit system than were their self-
attributed counterparts. The most obvious explanation for 
this finding is that McClelland et al. 's (1989) 
formulations regarding a bi-level motivational system are 
incorrect; this possibility will be further addressed 
later. A number of alternate explanations are possible as 
well. First, it may be that the predicted maximal measure 
effect does exist, but is quite small. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that 
nonsignificant results uniformly fell in predicted 
directions, except in the case of male communal 
intermotive relationships. Second, it may be that the 
ability measure employed was invalid--this was an 
unresearched measure constructed solely for the present 
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investigation. Finally, it may be that personality 
abilities, at least when assessed via respondent 
questionnaires, are interchangeable with self-attributed 
motives; the constructs' shared verbal, self-schematic 
similarities may outweigh their conceptual differences. 
Personal strivings. In the present conceptualization 
of the bi-level motivational system, personal strivings 
are intersystem mediators. Strivings' proposed 
topographic location actually spawned two related 
hypotheses. First, it was expected that strivings would 
be more closely aligned with implicit motives than would 
be self-attributed motives. Correlational and Wilcoxon 
analyses of this proposition produced inconsistent and 
generally nonsupportive results. In the case of agentic 
motives, § Agency is probably no more closely aligned with 
n Agency than is san Agency. In the case of communion, § 
Communion and san Communion appear equally and moderately 
related to n Communion. The second hypothesis predicted 
that strivings would be more strongly related to self-
attributed motives than would be implicit motives. In 
this regard, an unexpected pattern of results emerged. 
Specifically, confirmatory patterns were obtained in 
gender-congruent motivational domains, while contrasexual 
domains produced nonsupportive (men) and opposing (women) 
patterns. Actually, these findings make sense in light of 
the previously-advanced speculations regarding gender and 
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self-attributed motive development. It was mentioned 
earlier that gender-congruent self-attributed motives may 
be normatively out of alignment with the implicit domain, 
due to the farmer's basis in pat societal ideologies 
rather than in empathic attunement to individual nature. 
Maintenance of gender-congruent self-attributed motives, 
then, often amounts to a struggle to maintain a socially 
desirable, socially mandated self-image in the face of 
implicit nature. The obtained results suggest that 
strivings may be allies of the self-attributed system in 
this struggle, comprising a verbally-represented (as 
opposed to visceral) goal system. In summary, the general 
framing of personal strivings as intersystem mediators 
received inconsistent support in the present 
investigation. 
The Bi-Level Motivational System in Perspective 
The approach taken thus far in the present discussion 
has been to account for findings relevant to individual 
hypotheses piecemeal. Along the way, separate 
explanations have been advanced for each group of 
findings, many of which were unpredicted and/or 
nonsupportive. This bevy of speculations should not 
obscure a more basic fact. Experimental hypotheses were 
generally not confirmed, and thus, strong support for 
McClelland et al. 's bi-level motivational system has not 
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been obtained. Indeed, the most parsimonious explanation 
for obtained patterns is that the implicit/self-attributed 
motive framework is faulty. Although parsimonious, 
however, such conclusions seem unwarranted in the face of 
two findings. First, the most basic unpredicted finding 
of the present study is that contrasexual implicit and 
self-attributed motives do evidence substantial 
correspondence. When both are adequately sampled, then, 
contrasexual implicit and self-attributed systems 
evidence an appreciable interrelation. Second, this 
baseline correspondence can be enhanced by various self-
consciousness variables: low inner-directedness, or 
artlessness, enhances intermotive correspondence for males 
and perhaps females, while low other-directedness further 
enhances congruence for females. While both these 
findings are assimilable via McClelland et al. 's model, 
albeit with a few modifications to account for gender 
effects, they are not assimilable by psychometric 
explanations: if operant and respondent measures do not 
interrelate because of psychometric shortcomings, then 
this interrelation should hold for gender-congruent and 
contrasexual motives. It does not. Furthermore, 
psychometric explanations do not readily account for 
intermotive correspondence's mediation by self-
consciousness variables, regardless of the direction of 
mediational effects. If the misalignment is "in the 
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measures," then factors "in the person" should not 
substantially reduce misalignment. 
Limitations of the Present Work and Suggestions for Future 
Research 
The present work has serious limitations in the areas 
of statistical conclusion validity, internal validity, and 
external validity. The major problems in each of these 
areas will now be addressed. Statistical conclusion 
validity was firstly compromised by small Ns, which 
resulted in low statistical power. This limitation was 
especially evident in within-gender analyses, where 
memberships in various comparison groups (e.g., low other-
directedness males, high inner-directedness females, etc.) 
typically ranged from 20-30. Additionally, the sheer 
number of analyses conducted (over 60) certainly led to a 
few spuriously significant results. The above factors 
probably interacted with. the idiosyncrasies of various 
statistical techniques to produce the rampant 
inconsistencies observed between (seemingly) parallel 
mean-comparison and correlational analyses. 
The most prominent threat to internal validity stems 
from the present work's basis in correlational, rather 
than experimental, approaches. The characterological 
natures of inner- and other-directedness prevented the 
experimental manipulation of the variables, as well as the 
subsequent random assignment of subjects to high- and low-
172 
inner/other-directedness conditions. Consequently, other 
uncontrolled variables were left free to covary with 
experimental variables. Indeed, such unchecked 
covariation may account for some of the unexpected 
findings: constructs such as defensiveness, 
hypervigilance, insightfulness, inner receptivity, 
openness to experience, and dependence may relate to one 
or the other of the focal variables. Indeed, measures for 
inner- and other-directedness have as yet to be 
empirically discriminated from the above concepts. 
The inviability of random assignment in the present 
research also fostered ambiguity regarding the direction 
of causal influence. As elaborated earlier, it is unclear 
whether the self-consciousness variables cause intermotive 
noncorrespondence or reflect symptomatic reactions to it. 
As regards external validity, the present research is 
hampered by its exclusive focus on college students. It 
is by no means clear that relationships obtained for 
individ~als traversing the maturational threshold between 
familial embeddedness and adult autonomy would generalize 
to fully individuated adults. Similarly, propositions 
unsupported by the data may in fact hold for an older, 
adult population. 
The most obvious general suggestion for future 
research is that the present investigation be replicated. 
such a replication would feature the post-hoc explanations 
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advanced above as a priori hypotheses. For example, 
moderate contrasexual intermotive correspondence would be 
predicted, and inner-directedness would be expected to 
relate to decreased correspondence. Future research in 
this area would additionally do well to examine other 
potential mediators of intermotive alignment. For 
example, neuroticism and anxiety should be related to 
motive misalignment, while maturity, integration, and 
subjective well-being should be related to relative motive 
alignment. A particularly powerful test of McClelland et 
al.'s (1989) ideas might be conducted in a mental health 
setting: psychotherapy should enhance intermotive 
congruence, and therapists' ratings of psychological 
integration should roughly correspond with operant-
respondent alignment. 
On a more general note, motivational researchers, 
especially those employing TAT motive measures, should be 
alerted to the need for more rigorous motive assessment. 
The present study relied upon the comprehensive, composite 
assessment of general motivational clusterings. This 
broader sampling allowed for the uncovering of a 
relationship that departs from the lack of intermotive 
correlation reported by the TAT community. In short, 
researchers such as McClelland (1980) and Koestner et al. 
(1988) may be confusing sampling error with motive 
noncorrespondence. Gender, as discussed earlier, seems to 
174 
be the biggest mediator of motive congruence. Should 
future replications corroborate this conclusion, then 
McClelland et al.'s (1989) system must be refined to 
account for gender effects. Some tentative refinements of 
this sort were advanced above. It is also incumbent upon 
implicit motive researchers to develop alternate measures 
of implicit motives--measures that relate with TAT indices 
in predictable ways. The demonstration of such 
relationships is crucial to the implicit system's validity 
as a legitimate, coherent domain. While the present study 
employed alternate implicit motive measures, they were of 
insufficient length to definitively speak on this issue. 
Summary 
The primary aim of the present investigation was to 
examine and clarify the well-documented failure of operant 
and respondent motive measures to interrelate. Critics 
such as Entwisle (1972) and Raven (1988) have implicated 
psychometric flaws in one or the other type of measure as 
the cause for this failure. For them, both types of 
measure tap the same construct, only more or less well. 
McClelland et al. (1989), on the other hand, assert that 
operant and respondent measures tap distinct motivational 
layers within the individual, layers which need not be in 
accord. Obtained results were partially supportive of 
both psychometric and construct-based explanations, though 
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definitively supportive of neither. The psychometric 
perspective was vindicated in that predictions for 
strivings and personality abilities were generally not 
supported. Additionally, the comprehensive, composite 
measurement of agentic and communal motives apparently 
allowed for the uncovering of intermotive relationships 
previously submerged in measurement error. In short, 
contrasexual motives showed an appreciable amount of 
correspondence, while gender-congruent motives did not. 
Psychometric explanations, however, can accommodate 
neither (1) low other-directedness' predicted congruence-
enhancing effect (females' communal motives only), 
(2) the mediation of intermotive congruence by gender, nor 
(3) inner-directedness' unpredicted congruence-lessening 
effect. While McClelland et al. 's (1989) bi-level 
motivational theory did not predict the latter two 
findings a priori, it can be modified post hoc to account 
for them. The restriction of normative motive 
misalignment to gender-congruent domains probably follows 
from the parental/societal imposition of explicit gender 
schemata. It is further proposed that inner-directedness 
and other-directedness are responses to motive 
incongruence, or neurosis, rather than facilitators of it. 
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